Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 4

Article 7

5-2006

High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges
from Tort and Contract
E. Haavi Morreim Ph.D.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
E. Haavi Morreim Ph.D., High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and
Contract, 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 1207 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol59/iss4/7

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

High-Deductible Health Plans:
New Twists on Old Challenges from
Tort and Contract
E. Haavi Morreim, Ph.D.,
1.

II.

INTRODU CTION ...................................................................
A.
H istory ....................................................................
B.
Crossroadsand Evolution ......................................
C.
Imp lications............................................................

1208
1209
1212
1214

INFORM ED CONSENT ........................................................... 1217

A.

III.

IV .

V.

D uty of Care............................................................
1218
1.
C osts ............................................................ 12 19
2.
Medical Importance ..................................... 1222
B.
Inju ry ......................................................................
1224
C.
Causality.................................................................
1225
D.
Defenses ...................................................................
1225
1.
Assumption of Risk ...................................... 1226
2.
Contributory Negligence and
Comparative Fault ...................................... 1229
3.
Recom m endations ........................................ 1231
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY ............................................. 1232
A.
Defining Fiduciaries............................................... 1232
B.
Opportunitiesfor Breach of FiduciaryDuty .......... 1235
C.
JudicialResponses to Breach of FiduciaryDuty ... 1239
CONTRACT LAW .................................................................. 1243
A.
Basic Contract Principles....................................... 1244
B.
Case L aw .................................................................
1245
C.
"Reasonable Charge"-An Elusive Concept ............. 1251
D.
Juries and the Quest for the Reasonable Fee ......... 1257
PROGNOSIS AND SOME HOPE .............................................. 1259

1.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the very helpful comments provided on earlier
versions of this paper by Marsha Cope Huie, J.D., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, J.D., Nicholas P.
Terry, LL.M., Peter Jacobson, J.D., M.P.H., Lance Stell, Ph.D., and Howard Entman, M.D.

1207

1208

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
I.

[Vol. 59:4:1207

INTRODUCTION

In just a few decades American health care financing has, in a
sense, come full circle. After being largely patient-financed in the
early twentieth century, generous insurance coverage in mid-century
largely permitted providers to do as they wished and charge what they
pleased-an Artesian Well of Money that left patients and physicians
well-insulated from the costs of care.
That system's inevitable
explosion of costs spurred urgent efforts to contain health care
expenditures, as payors sought to control or at least influence medical
decisions. In many ways this "managed care" was clinically vexatious
and economically disappointing. Its medically intrusive tactics have
now largely though not entirely faded, and-back to the future-the
current trend is to place economic responsibility back in patients'
hands via "Consumer-Defined Health Plans" ("CDHPs") that couple
catastrophic insurance coverage with large deductibles.
Across this trajectory of financial changes, the focus of health
care litigation has evolved right alongside. When physicians largely
controlled both care and costs, medical malpractice occupied center
stage. Then, as managed care entities exerted greater financial and
clinical control, they too became litigation targets, sometimes via
direct corporate liability for their own financial and medical decisions,
and sometimes under ostensible agency for alleged missteps of
physicians with whom they associated. And now, as patients regain
financial responsibility, the focus will shift yet again.
This Article explores that shift. After further surveying history
and the current transition to CDHPs, I will examine three kinds of
litigation that are especially likely to arise where patients pay for
their own care. Torts questions will arise: when physicians do not
disclose the projected costs of care, is this a breach of informed
consent?
Further issues may arise from the fact that, although
physicians have a confidential relationship with patients, their
financial interests can create significant conflicts of interest. Where
physicians' medical recommendations are too cozy with their own
financial interests, can this be a breach of fiduciary duty? Finally,
contract questions will emerge around pricetags. Where prices are not
agreed on in advance, they must generally be "reasonable." And yet
price structures in health care are often too incomprehensible to
discern what "reasonableness" might mean. When patients complain
providers' charges are too high, jurors may be asked to address
important questions of health care pricing.
Many of these potential litigation issues are not inherently
novel. But they may arise with surprising force and frequency. When
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large numbers of middle income people begin paying directly for
substantial procedures out of pocket, they will likely begin
scrutinizing more closely the ecomonic as well as medical wisdom of
their health care. This Article explores some of the directions that
scrutiny may take.
A. History
American health care has undergone a remarkable, relentless
series of economic changes. 2 During the mid-twentieth century, as
first-dollar insurance coverage became a standard workplace benefit,
most citizens came to expect that health care should cost little or
nothing from their own pockets. At the same time, health care costs
began to soar.
Retrospective fee-for-service ("FFS") reimbursement paid for
virtually any service because insurers were reluctant to challenge
providers' judgments about appropriate care. In turn, the 1965
enactment of Medicare and Medicaid began to base payment for each
service on what providers chose to charge, thereby sparking major
price inflation as physicians' and hospitals' charges rose.3 When
private insurers adopted similar reimbursement structures, health
care was essentially financed by an "Artesian Well of Money" 4 in
which costs posed no obstacle.

2.
For a considerably more extensive discussion of the history of health care's evolving
economic structures, see E. Haavi Morreim, Back to the Future: From Managed Care to PatientManaged Care, in THE ETHICS OF MANAGED CARE: PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY AND PATIENT

RIGHTS 139 (William B. Bondeson & James W. Jones eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002)
[hereinafter Back to the Future]; E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS
OF MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991) [hereinafter BALANCING
ACT]; STUART M. BUTLER, A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA (Edmund Haislmair ed.,
The Heritage Foundation 1989); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN

MEDICINE (Basic Books 1982) (1949); E. Haavi Morreim, Defined Contribution:From Managed
Care to Patient-Managed Care, 22 CATO JOURNAL 103 (2002) [hereinafter Managed Care to

Patient Managed Care]. For a recent re-examination of Starr's work, see Keith Wailoo et al.,
Professional Sovereignty in a Changing Health Care System: Reflections on Paul Starr's The
Social Transformation of American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 557 (2004).

3.

See infra Part IV.C; see also B.B. Roe, Sounding Boards. The UCR Boondoggle: A Death

Knell for Private Practice?, 305 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 41, 41-45 (1981). Private insurers followed

the government's method for paying providers, via "CPR" (customary, prevailing, and
reasonable) or "1CR" (usual, customary, and reasonable) fee schedules. As physicians learned
how to manipulate these systems, they quickly discerned that health care could be very lucrative
if they usually, customarily, and ever-so-reasonably charged very high fees. See also T.L.
Delbanco et al., Paying the Physician's Fee: Blue Shield and the Reasonable Charge, 301 NEW
ENGL. J. MED, 1314, 1314-20 (1979).

4.

E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM. J. L. &

MED. 79, 80 (1994).
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At the same time, insurers commonly deemed new drugs,
devices, and procedures "medically necessary"-and thus a covered
benefit-as soon as they received either government approval or
physician acceptance.
Manufacturers of drugs and devices, thus
assured of sales and profits, added energetically to the
5
armamentarium of costly medical interventions.
The inflationary effects of such a system were inevitable and
enormous. 6
The 1970s and '80s witnessed myriad but largely
unsuccessful cost containment efforts, 7 as national health care
expenditures continued to skyrocket.8 Meanwhile, the "Artesian"
framework still instructed physicians that considering costs over
patient welfare was unethical. 9
By the late 1980s, employers facing international competition
and a domestic recession determined that they no longer could absorb
limitless increases in health care costs and gave health insurers an

5.
HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING
HOSPITAL CARE (Brookings Inst. 1984).
6.
John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity and the Unitary Medical Malpractice Standard, 77
VA. L. REV. 439, 441 (1991). Siliciano goes on to note: 'The vast burgeoning of medical
technology, the rapid inflation of medical costs, and the rise of defensive medicine during the last
quarter century have greatly increased the costs of what is considered to be legally adequate
care." Id. at 456.
7.
In 1971 the Nixon administration applied a wage and price freeze that, even though
generally lifted in 1973, was retained another year for health care and a few other industries.
STARR, supra note 2, at 399. Thereafter came legislation attempting to restrain the proliferation
and unnecessary duplication of costly technology, followed by the Carter administration's threat
of mandatory price controls until hospitals agreed in 1979 to restrain their revenues voluntarily.
In 1982 the federal government added DRGs-the diagnosis-related group payment system-in
which hospitals are paid a flat sum for hospital care of a Medicare beneficiary, based on
diagnosis and other factors such as gender, age, and commodities. Instead of being rewarded for
doing more, hospitals would now do better by doing less. The system helped to restrain hospital
spending but left overall Medicare costs largely intact as hospitals simply shifted numerous
inpatient procedures to the outpatient setting where they would be paid for on the usual FFS
basis. BALANCING ACT, supra note 2, at 14-15. Employers tried their own measures, such as
increasing employees' copays, encouraging healthier lifestyles, and requiring second opinions for
surgeries. BUTLER, supra note 2, at 27; Marc P. Freiman, Cost Sharing Lessons from the Private
Sector, 3 HEALTH AFF. 85, 87-88 (1984); Robert E. Patricelli, Employers as Managers of Risk,
Cost, and Quality, 6 HEALTH AFF. 75, 76-77 (1987).
8.
STARR, supra note 2, at 414; BUTLER, supra note 2, at 17-25.
9.
Morreim, supra note 4, at 81-82. As Havighurst observes:
Although the medical profession's advocacy of quality in medical care without regard
to cost appeared to reflect a sincere concern for patient welfare, it also served
providers' economic interests. Not only did the suppression of normal economizing
impulses pave the way for expansive and demand-increasing definitions of the need
for providers' own services, but it also allowed providers to set their fees and charges
on a noncompetitive and therefore highly lucrative basis.
Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal
Obstacles, 49 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 151 (1986).
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ultimatum: Limit premium prices or lose business. The Artesian era
gave way to managed care.
Initial savings came easily enough, largely by trimming
excessive hospitalization and specialist interventions. 10 Easy cost
cuts, once exhausted, gave way to gloves-off tactics such as utilization
review, tight fee schedules or incentive systems for providers, and
onerous gatekeeper requirements.
Horror stories proliferated in the press, and litigation spread
throughout the courts. 12 By the late 1990s, as a booming economy
tightened the labor market, firms wanting to attract and retain good

10. Lengthy inpatient stays had become common. Insurers had based coverage on the
traditional catastrophic model of insurance, in which insurers cover only the high-dollar eventsauto accidents and house fires-whose costs cannot be absorbed by the ordinary person's budget,
while leaving routine matters such as oil changes and roof repairs in consumers' hands. Because
health plans therefore typically paid only for the care of patients sick enough to be in the
hospital, physicians often hospitalized patients to ensure the care would be covered. Against this
background, once insurers realized how much hospitalization was not medically justified,
reductions in hospital use generated substantial savings. Specialist services were also targeted
because primary care physicians (PCPs) often charged considerably less and used fewer
resources than specialists, even when caring for the same conditions. See David Azevedo, New
Strategies for Clamping Down on Referrals, 72 MED. ECON. 58, 58-73 (1995); P.D. Gerber et al.,
GeneralistPhysiciansand the New Health Care System, 97 AMER. J. MED. 554, 554-58 (1994); K.
Grumbach & T. Bodenheimer, The Organizationof Health Care, 273 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 160,
160-67 (1995); J.P. Kassirer, Access to Specialty Care, 331 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1151, 1151-53
(1994); J.C. Robinson & L.P. Casalino, Vertical Integration and Organizational Networks in
Health Care, 15 HEALTH AFF. 7, 9 (Spring 1996); S. Shea et al., PredisposingFactorsfor Severe,
Uncontrolled Hypertension in an Inner-City Minority Population, 327 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 776,
776-81 (1992).
11. See, e.g., David Azevedo, New Owners Drive This Group to Unionize, MED. ECON., Mar.
24, 1997, at 194; Jordan J. Cohen, White Coats Should Not Have Union Labels, 342 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 431 (2000); Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to Address Health
Insurance Coverage for Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REV. 203 (1999);
Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure,85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999); Edward B.
Hirshfeld, Physicians, Unions, and Antitrust, 32 J. HEALTH L. 43 (1999); Robert L. Lowes, These
Doctors Pay Their Dues-To a Union, MED. ECON., Jan. 26, 1998, at 157; David Orentlicher,
Paying PhysiciansMore To Do Less: FinancialIncentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155
(1996); Doreen Mangan, Will Doctor Unions Finally Take Hold?, MED. ECON., July 24, 1995, at
115; Stanford A. Marcus, Trade Unionism for Doctors: An Idea Whose Time has Come, 311 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1508 (1984); Laura Johannes, More HMOs Order Outpatient Mastectomies, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at B-i; R.F. Leibenluft, Attempts to "Level the PlayingField"-Developments
in HMO Merger, Enforcement, Antitrust Exemptions, and Physician Unions, 27 AHLA HEALTH
LAW DIGEST 3, 3-15 (Aug. 1999); J. Roemer, Fighting Back: How Labor Unions are Helping
PhysiciansRegain Some of Their Lost Power, 12 HIPPOCRATES 50, 50-52, 54-55, 59 (1998).
12. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997); Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22 1996, at 44;
Michael Meyer & Andrew Murr, Not My Health Care, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 36; David S.
Hilzenrath, Cutting Costs--or Quality?, WASH. POST WEEKLY EDITION, Aug. 28, 1995 to Sept. 3,
1995, at 6; George Anders, Who Pays Cost of Cut-Rate Heart Care?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1996, at
B-1.
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labor needed to provide generous benefits.1 3 Managed care's gloves-off
tactics eroded.14
This relative indifference to health care costs was short-lived,
however.
As economic boom gave way to recession in 2001,
corporations again needed to keep benefits expenses as low as
possible, even while the cost of health care began to rise again. Firms
were pressed between the unsavory options of cutting back on
benefits, increasing employees' share of the cost, or even eliminating
health benefits altogether. 15 At the same time, managed care's cost
containment "teeth" had already been largely lost during the boomyears. 16
B. Crossroads and Evolution
As the health care economy moved from the Artesian era to the
Managed Care era, many commentators realized that the financial
incentives guiding various participants were sometimes in sharp
opposition.
For instance, under DRGs Medicare typically paid
hospitals a fixed amount no matter how long a given patient stayed or
how many services he received, thus creating an incentive to discharge
patients as efficiently as possible. Physicians, still paid fee-for-service,
received another fee for every day and every service the patient
consumed.
Hence, hospitals' incentives directly conflicted with
physicians'.
Such discrepancies precipitated efforts to "align" the interests
of physicians, hospitals, clinics, insurers, health plans, administrators,

13. In essence, "'[e]mployers seem to have lost their teeth entirely.... They are so
constrained by tight labor markets they don't want to be aggressive with plans or employees."'
Ron Winslow et al., Back on the Front Burner, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2001, at R3 (quoting Paul
Ginsburg of the Center for Studying Health System Change); see also David Blumenthal,
ControllingHealth Care Expenditures, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 766 (2001).
14. R. Adams Dudley & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care in Transition,344 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1087 (2001); Ken Terry, Has Capitation Reached its High-Water Mark?, MED. ECON., Feb. 19,
2001, at 33; Lewis A. Lefko, Changing the Way Managed Care Does Business: The Texas Attorney
General's Settlement with Aetna, HEALTH L. DIG., Oct, 2000, at 1; Barbara Martinez, Aetna Tries
to Improve Bedside Manner in Bid to Help Bottom Line, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2001, at A-i;
Thomas M. Burton, United Health to End Ruling on Treatments, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1999, at A3; Ron Winslow, Oxford to Give More Control to Specialists, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1997, at B-i;
J.A. Jacob, Aetna Revises Physician Contract, AMER. MED. NEWS 1, 38, 39 (Nov. 9, 1998); J.
Johnsson, New Incentive Rules Offer First Curbs on Capitation,AM. MED. NEWS 3, 27 (Jan. 27,
1997).
15. Milt Freudenheim, H.M.O. Costs Spur Employers to Shift Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2000; Milt Freudenheim, Consumers Facing Sharp Rise in Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2000.
16. See Burton, supra note 14.
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employers, and governments via tools such as incentive systems and
17
integrated networks.
All this aligning usually neglected one crucial partypatients' 8-via two justifications. First, patients' top priority was
presumably to get well. Ill people are often less capable of consumer
deliberation and should not have to worry about costs, it was thought.
Second, as an obverse corollary, patients who had little direct contact
with the cost of their care were deemed ill-equipped to decide which
care is worth buying, and could not be trusted to decide which care
was cost-worthy.1 9 As patients were neither expected nor allowed to
decide which care is worth buying, they were largely relegated to
being passive recipients of others' decisions about what care they
could receive from whom.
However, that exclusion is now changing dramatically. Many
employers and payors have come to believe that if the patient has
something financial at stake, he may be more interested in the
economic as well as the medical value of his care. The Medicare
20
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act ("MMA") of
2003 incorporated a provision permitting citizens to couple highdeductible catastrophic insurance policies with tax-free health savings
accounts ("HSAs") from which users pay for medical expenses within
the deductible, as well as health-related expenses not covered by
21
insurance.
A qualifying catastrophic policy must have a deductible of at
least $1,000 for an individual and $2,000 for a family. 22 Employers or
anyone else can contribute to a person's HSA, where the monies,
including interest and earnings, remain tax-free so long as they are
17. E. Haavi Morreim, Diverse and Perverse Incentives of Managed Care: Bringing Patients
into Alignment, 1 WID. L. SYMP. J. 89 (1996).
18. For more detailed discussion of these efforts to align incentives and the ways in which
patients were excluded, see Morreim, supra note 17; see also Daniel P. Sulmasy, Managed Care
and ManagedDeath, 155 ARCHIVE OF INTERNAL MED. 133 (1995); Mark C. Rogers et al., Cultural
and OrganizationalImplications of Academic Managed-Care Networks, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED.

1374, 1376 (1994); L.I. Sederer, Managed Mental Health Care and ProfessionalCompensation, 12
BEHAV. SCi. & LAW 367, 367-78 (1994); M.A. Hall, The Ethics of Health Care Rationing, 8 PUB.
AFF. Q. 33, 34 (1994).

19. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reorganizing the Financial Flows in American Health Care, 12
HEALTH AFF. 172 (Supp. 1993); Uwe E. Reinhardt, American Values: Are They Blocking HealthSystem Reform?, MED. ECON., Nov. 2, 1992, at 126; James P. Weaver, The Best Care Other

People's Money Can Buy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1992, at A-14.
20. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act § 1201(a), 26 U.S.C.
§ 223 (2006) (amending IRC § 223(c)(2)(C) and defining Health Savings Account).
21. Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-driven
Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395-397 (2005) [hereinafter Role of State Regulation].
22. For further discussion, see Joseph P. Newhouse, Consumer- Directed Health Plans and
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, 23 HEALTH AFF. 107 (2004).
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used for authorized health care expenses. Initially, up to $2,650 could
be placed annually into an individual's HSA, and $5,250 into a
23
family's-caps now raised to $2,700 and $5450, respectively.
These Consumer-Defined Health Plans ("CDHPs") are a
rapidly growing segment of the health insurance industry. Most
major insurers now offer such plans, and increasing numbers of
24
employers are embracing them:
[By mid-2004, s]ome 50 insurers, including Aetna Inc., Cigna Corp. and Anthem Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, a unit of Anthem Inc., have introduced the high-deductible health
policies that people must have to open an HSA. Aetna says it has signed 25 large
employers and 200 small companies to offer its HSA-qualified plan to employees, and it
is rolling out one for individuals. . . . By next year, HSAs are expected to become a
standard product of many health insurers and large financial-services firms.
. . In
tandem, an increasing number of employers, from mom-and-pop operations to major
corporations such as Pitney Bowes Inc., are offering HSAs to employees. A study by
Mercer Human Resources in April found that 81 percent of all employers with 20,000 or
more employees are "somewhat" or "very" likely to offer them by 2006.25

More than 3 million federal employees are also expected to have
26
CDHPs with HSAs.
C. Implications
The ramifications of bringing patients into the economics of
their care will likely be substantial. Instead of demanding antibiotics
for minor sore throats or begging their physicians to prescribe the
latest high-cost drug advertised on television, patients are more likely
to ask, "Do I really need that?" and "Can't I use generic?". A demand

23. Joanne Wojcik, Maximum HSA Contributions Increased, BUS. INS., Oct. 31, 2005,
availableat http://www.businessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?newsId=6622.
24. Louise Story, Health Savings Accounts Gain Momentum, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2004, at
D2. A Hewitt Associates survey of 270 companies indicated that 60% of large employers are
likely to soon offer these accounts. Shari Roan, More Choice, At a Cost: Consumer-Directed
Health Plans Give Patients Freedom to Choose-and a Larger Bill, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004; see
also Rhonda L. Rundle, Kaiser to Offer Savings Accounts for Lower-Cost Health Coverage, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 15, 2004; Sarah Rubenstein, Buying Health Insurance, Cafeteria Style, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 19, 2004; Marguerite Higgins, Blue Cross to Offer Option by 2006, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2004; Trueman, HSAs Spread Quickly, Surprise Critics, 4 HEALTH CARE NEWS, 1, 4 (Sept. 2004);
R. Feldman et al., Health Savings Accounts: Early Estimates of National Take-Up, 24 HEALTH
AFF. 1582 (Nov./Dec. 2005); Grace-Marie Turner, HSA Enrollment Tripled in Less than a Year,
Study Says, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Mar. 1, 2006, available at http://www.heartland.org
/Article.cfm?artId=18590&CFID=3782636&CFTOKE N=48510425. One of the greatest current
drawbacks to these plans is the possibility that, in their current form, CDHPs with HSAs may
not be as suitable for people with chronic conditions. Ron Lieber, The Health Savings Plan You
Can't Get: Why Employers Are Slow to Try HSAs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2004.
25. Story, supra note 24.
26. Milt Freudenheim, A Health Insurance Option Coming to Federal Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2004.
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27
for magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") to diagnose lower back pain
may instead be, "How much will that cost me, doctor?" Patients who
never glanced at their insurer's "statement of benefits" may be much
more likely to scrutinize the bills when paying with their own
28
money.
Instead of exploring all the economic implications and legal
ramifications of CDHPs, 29 this Article will explore a fairly
circumscribed area, namely the care patients seek within their (now
much larger) deductible-the care they buy directly out of their HSAs
or their pockets. Although the great majority of health care dollars
are spent on chronic diseases and on catastrophic illnesses and
injuries, the great majority of people use relatively few resources in a
given year. As noted by one observer, "85% of Americans spend less
than $3000 a year on medical care, and 73% have less than $500 a
year in claims."30 As of 1996, the top 10 percent of patients accounted
for nearly 70 percent of total health expenditures, while the top 30
percent consumed 90 percent.
This picture has not changed
significantly over several decades. 31 As a result, the great majority of

27. Although physicians have sometimes been quick to seek MRI scans for lower back pain,
studies have shown it has little real value in most cases. See Mureen C. Jensen et al., Magnetic
Resonance Imaging of the Lumbar Spine in People Without Back Pain, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 69
(1994); Richard A. Deyo, Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Lumbar Spine: Terrific Test or Tar
Baby?, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 115 (1994).
28. It is important to note that CDHPs will present internal complexities. Insurers will not
count each and every health-related expense toward the patient's deductible. If the patient's
policy does not cover drugs, for instance, then his drug expenditures will not count toward his
deductible. Sarah Rubenstein, Watch Out For Some Pitfalls of Health Savings Accounts, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 17, 2004. Overall, many insurers offering CDHPs will use their
standard claims processing systems, including medical necessity review, to determine
when the policy deductible (and, ultimately, the out-of-pocket maximum) has been
met for any particular subscriber. In general, only insured expenses can be counted
against a deductible. If a subscriber with a $3,000 deductible receives an outpatient
surgery costing $2,500, insurers are unlikely to credit the cost of the surgery fully
against the deductible without determining whether the surgery was a covered
expense, whether $2,500 was a reasonable charge, and whether the subscriber
received pre-approval for the surgery if required under the policy. In short, even
while spending their own money from HSAs, subscribers will be subject to some
managed care controls to the extent that they attempt to claim these expenses against
their insurance deductibles.
Role of State Regulation, supra note 21, at 408-09; see also M. A. Hall & C. C. Havighurst,
Reviving Managed Care with Health Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1494-95
(Nov./Dec. 2005).
29. For some further discussion, see Managed Care to Patient-ManagedCare, supra note 2;
Back to the Future, supranote 2.
30. Editorial, Consumer-FirstHealth Care, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1994 at A-12.
31. Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures,
Revisited, 20 HEALTH AFF. 9, 12 (2001). Similarly, Luft observed that one percent of the
population consumes thirty percent of all medical care costs, while the bottom fifty percent
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people in CDHPs will be completely responsible for their own health
care costs. Although all will have financial help from the government
via tax breaks, and most will have HSA subsidies from their
employers, each medical expenditure will have a direct economic
impact on the patient.
This Article discusses three kinds of legal issue that will likely
arise when patients pay for their care. Part II explains that traditional
informed consent conversations will increasingly incorporate an
economic dimension as patients more often expect the physician to tell
or at least help them find out what a proposed intervention will cost.
Concomitantly, this financial interest will increase patients' need to
know how important, medically, a proposed test or treatment is, and
how well-grounded it is in medical research. Marginally useful
interventions may be fine out of an insurer's pocket, but much less
palatable out of one's own. Meanwhile, physicians can expect more
patients to decline their recommendations due to cost concerns. Here,
too, informed consent conversations will likely evolve as physicians
need to explain more clearly the consequences of such refusals. When
they do so carefully, doctrines like assumption of risk and contributory
negligence/comparative fault can provide considerable insulation from
tort claims when patients' refusals lead to bad outcomes.
Part III explains how physicians' financial stake in the care
they recommend, and the conflicts of interest thereby spawned, could
lead to claims for breach of fiduciary duty. In some cases, these
conflicts might concern allegedly excessive services that boost
physicians' income. Another potential conflict is "defensive medicine"
practices in which the physician allegedly orders needless tests and
treatments to protect herself from litigation; these, too, can increase
the patient's bill but not his health. Although such issues have always
posed the possibility of claims for breach of fiduciary duty, they have
not triggered much interest heretofore, probably because such
expenditures usually consume insurers' rather than patients' money.
Where patients see their own pockets or HSAs drained to enhance
what they believe to be the physician's rather than their own
wellbeing, this sort of litigation would not be surprising.
Finally, fresh twists on contract law may emerge. As discussed
in Part IV, patients may experience "sticker shock" on seeing their bill
if costs were not discussed during treatment decisions. In a number of
recent suits alleging that charges were excessive, courts have agreed

accounts for only three percent of expenditures. Harold S. Luft, Modifying Managed Competition
to Address Cost and Quality, 15 HEALTH AFF. 23, 26 (1995).
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that fees for medical services must be "reasonable." Determining
what constitutes "reasonableness," however, can be vexatious at best.
Overall, the goal of this Article is simply to anticipate the shifts
in direction that litigation may take under CDHPs. Two caveats are
in order.
First, this Article focuses only on patients' own
expenditures, i.e., those below the deductible threshold. 32 Insurers
providing catastrophic coverage will use their own approaches to
constrain costs and, while interesting and important, these are quite
different from the tensions that will arise within the physician-patient
relationship when the patient's own money is at stake.
Second, these issues are neither new nor inherently novel. They
can arise anywhere that people must pay for their own health care.
All too many Americans lack health insurance entirely. What is
distinctive is that, as CDHPs become widespread, those who
personally pay substantial amounts will no longer be mainly the
powerless and medically indigent. Rather, large numbers of middleclass people who are quite well insured via catastrophic coverage will
nevertheless have a significant financial stake in their health care
costs. Issues long lurking in the background can be expected to rise,
with color and vehemence, to the foreground.

II. INFORMED CONSENT
In health care, breach of informed consent is ordinarily a
negligence tort within the broader genre of medical malpractice.3 3
Classically, the physician provides some information but not enough
for the patient to make a reasonably informed decision. Breach of
informed consent is less severe than battery, which involves a
complete lack of information or consent to the physician's contact. 34
Against this background, we can inquire what sort of tort case
might be made for breach of informed consent if a physician fails to
discuss costs with patients who personally pay for care.
Our
32. As noted above, even these out-of-pocket or HSA expenses will commonly be subject to
cost caps and/or utilization management. See Rubenstein, supra note 28.
33.

BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 397-99, 406-09

(West Publishing 3d ed. 1997).
34.
The law of battery provides protection against unauthorized touching of the human
body. While most cases in which this protection is invoked involve touchings that are
harmful, this is not a requirement to establish battery. The law of battery also
protects against touchings that are offensive, even if they do not inflict bodily harm.
In so doing, battery protects "the purely dignitary interest in the body that it be free
from offensive contact."
Alan Meisel, A 'Dignitary Tort'as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of
Informed Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 211 (1988).
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discussion will follow the classic elements of tort: duty and breach,
injury, and causation, followed by an exploration of available defenses
when a patient declines a recommendation because of cost and then
suffers an adverse outcome.
A. Duty of Care
The standard of disclosure for informed consent is constructed
in either of two ways. The older approach, consistent with traditional
malpractice doctrines, looks to what the profession commonly discloses
and requires the testimony of expert witnesses. 35 In contrast, about
half of states 36 have adopted a newer standard that emerged through
a trinity of cases in 1972. 37 It asks what patients need to know to
make an informed decision.
Canterbury v. Spence38 defined this
standard as whatever information would be "material" to the patient's
"right of self-decision." 39 At the same time, even states using this
patient-based standard do not base a physician's disclosure duty on
the vagaries of what any specific patient would want to know. Rather,
nearly all embrace an "objective" standard, namely, what the
reasonable and prudent patient in similar circumstances would need
40
to know.
35. Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Ark. 1980) (stating that the "disclosure standard
always requires expert medical testimony").
36. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and
Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 367 (2002); Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing
Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 314 (1999).
37. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); see also Meisel, supra note 34, at 215: The
Supreme Court of Connecticut voiced the transition well:
The incongruity of making the medical profession the sole arbiter of what information
was necessary for an informed decision to be made by a patient concerning his own
physical well-being has led to various judicial and legislative attempts within the last
decade to define a standard tailored to the needs of the patient but not unreasonably
burdensome upon the physician or wholly dispensing with the notion that 'doctor
knows best' in some situations. While the essential ambivalence between the right of
the patient to make a knowledgeable choice and the duty of the doctor to prescribe the
treatment his professional judgment deems best for the patient has not been fully
resolved, the outline has begun to emerge.
Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 299 (Conn. 1983).
38. Canterbury,464 F.2d at 786.
39. Id. Interestingly, although a number of states moved quickly to adopt the "patientbased" standard after 1972, several actually reversed course after physicians pressured state
legislatures, including New York, Ohio, and Vermont. Logan, 465 A.2d at 300.
40. For broader discussion of informed consent doctrine and evolution, see PAUL S.
APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (Oxford U.

Press 1987); Joan H. Krause, ReconceptualizingInformed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1999); Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient
Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985); Meisel, supra note 34; Alexander M.
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Via either standard, two kinds of information are likely to be of
greatest interest: the anticipated costs of proposed interventions and
their likely medical value.
1. Costs
When the patient pays directly for the proposed treatment or
diagnostic test, cost will often be an important consideration. His
headache may be well worth an $800 computed tomography ("CT")
scan if insurance is paying, but shelling that sum out of his own HSA
may suddenly prompt a keen interest in "watchful waiting" or other
more conservative approaches.
One problem is that providers can not always produce, in
advance, a layout of expected charges. For one thing, it may not be
possible to predict all the services the patient will need, particularly if
the problem is complex and unexpected findings could require quick
changes of plans. Additionally, many providers do not have a set
charge for each service. As discussed below, 4 1 a provider's fee for a
particular service can vary widely, depending on what fee schedules
have been negotiated with a given payer.
Equally important, a physician often has no way to know other
providers' charges for their goods and services. Pharmacy prices vary
widely, and hospital services even more, as do charges for durable
medical equipment, home nursing services-the whole panoply of
42
health care.
The problems are not entirely insuperable, however.
A
physician should ordinarily be able to tell a patient what he will
charge for his own services. After all, for patients who are paying
directly, the physician's billing office will usually expect payment at
the conclusion of the visit. If the office can produce the charges just
before the patient leaves, they should be able to find them a bit
earlier, at the time of making decisions. Quite possibly the relevant
fee schedules can be downloaded into hand-held Personal Digital
Assistants ("PDAs") for easy access.
Similarly, a physician might be wise to have at least a general
idea of the prevailing price-range for the most common interventions
she might prescribe during an office encounter, such as ordinary
medications. Although a physician should not be expected to know
which pharmacies sell at what price, she should know the general
Capron, Informed Consent in CatastrophicDisease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
340 (1974).
41. See infra Part [V.C (discussing the multiplicity of bases for computing charges).
42. See id. (discussing hospital pricing).
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price range of the drugs she most commonly prescribes. Otherwise,
the patient may not discover that he cannot afford the drug until he
reaches the pharmacy. Thereafter, if he is too embarrassed to explain
that he could not afford the prescription, future care may labor under
the misimpression that the drug did not work, rather than the truth
that it was never taken. Some familiarity with basic price ranges is
thus part of good medical care, not just a potential element of
informed consent.
Whether the failure to make such basic pricing available is a
breach of informed consent, at least for the physician's own services,
will likely depend on which standard is applied. Under a physicianbased standard of disclosure, the question is whether physicians
under the same or similar circumstances would provide fee
information. This approach has the advantage of recognizing that it
can be difficult to produce accurate figures and that only where prices
are readily available might it be reasonable to hold a physician liable
under breach of informed consent theory.
On the other hand, the physician-based standard might simply
entrench undesirable habits if nondisclosure is the norm. As noted, a
physician should at least disclose what he will charge for his own
services-even if he is not obligated to know what portion43 of that fee a
given insurer will count toward that patient's deductible.
In contrast, the patient-based standard will ask whether price
information is "material" to a decision about whether to purchase a
recommended test or treatment. Many patients will think it is. Much
of the routine care we seek is for symptomatic relief or for reassurance
that the problem is benign. The patient may feel "$20 worth of
miserable," but a bill for $200 could make him feel worse than the
symptoms he wants to relieve.
Courts' views regarding materiality may be difficult to predict.
On one hand, physicians can have some obligation to help patients
with financial issues. In the case of Chew v. Meyer, 44 Herbert Chew
underwent surgery and asked his surgeon to document for his
employer that Chew's absence from work was medically necessary.
Dr. Meyer agreed to direct his secretary to complete the forms.
However, despite multiple inquiries and proddings from Chew, Meyer
did not send the forms until after Chew's employment was terminated
for failure to furnish that documentation. The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals held that the physician's promise constituted an
undertaking that, although gratuitously made, carried a duty to
43.
44.

See Rubenstein, supra note 28.
Chew v, Meyer, 527 A.2d 828 (Md. App. 1987).
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discharge the promise in a proper and timely manner. The court also
found another basis for liability:
[In earlier times, the plaintiffs claim] might well have been summarily rejected, on the
basis that a physician's obligation ordinarily did not extend beyond his duty to use his
best efforts to treat and cure. The traditional scope of the contractual relationship
between doctor and patient, however, has expanded over the years as a result of the
proliferation of health and disability insurance, sick pay and other employment benefits.
Today, the patient commonly, and necessarily, enlists the aid of his or her physician in
preparing claims forms for health and disability benefits. Such forms ordinarily require
information possessed solely by the treating physician as well as the physician's
5
signature attesting to the bona fides of that medical information.4

Therefore, the court concluded, the plaintiff had on these two grounds
46
a "plausible cause of action for breach of contract."
Although Chew does not directly support the idea that
physicians should describe payment options to patients who balk at
treatment by reason of cost, it does at least open the door to the
possibility that a court could expect a physician to help patients
47
answer financial questions directly related to treatment.
4
8
On the other hand, in Arato v. Avedon,
the California
Supreme Court held, as a matter of law, that a physician did not
breach informed consent when he failed to reveal prognosis
information that would have enabled the patient to put his financial
affairs in order before his death. Reluctant to unleash unlimited
duties, the court stipulated that physicians are not required to disclose
information relevant to patients' nonmedical interests. Rather, the
duty focuses on the risks, benefits, and alternatives of a medical
49
intervention.
Arato does not necessarily preclude a duty to disclose the
projected costs of care. After all, costs are a direct "side-effect" of
treatment, potentially as important to many patients as the likelihood
of physical risks.
The case does, nevertheless, caution against
assuming that courts will be unified regarding "materiality" in this
challenging area.
Overall, the physician should at least be prepared to respond
when a patient asks about prices and know that some interventions
are costly enough to prompt patients to pause. If he does not have
45. Id. at 832.
46. Id.
47. In Wickline v. State of California,192 Cal. App.3d 1630, 1644 (1987), a case in which a
payor denied extension of hospitalization despite the physician's request, the California court of
appeals said in dicta that "the physician who complies without protest with the limitations
imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his
ultimate responsibility for his patient's care."
48. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993)
49. Id. at 607.
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pricing information readily available, he may be able to help the
patient investigate. Several online sources now make drug prices
available, 50 for instance, and if a computer or internet-linked PDA is
51
available in the office, the relevant information might be found.
2. Medical Importance
Costs are not the sole element of choice. If patients are to
decide intelligently whether a proposed intervention is worth its cost,
they must know not just its price but also its medical merit. Hence,
physicians must be prepared to explain the medical importance and
reasonable alternatives to the care they propose. These are classic
requisites of informed consent. In Truman v. Thomas, 52 for instance, a
woman declined a pap smear on grounds of cost. 53 When she died
from cervical cancer that might have been diagnosed in time for
successful treatment if she'd had the test, the Supreme Court of
California held that the physician's duty of informed consent required
him to tell the patient the consequences of foregoing the proposed
54
recommendation.
In Smith v. Reisig,55 a patient injured during a hysterectomy
later learned that an alternative treatment might have permitted her
to avoid the hysterectomy entirely. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
held that when the physician fails to disclose medically viable
alternatives, the damages can include the cost of the treatment itself
56
as well as any complications arising from that treatment.
Across the American health care system, it has been argued that
much of our care is unnecessary.5 7 CT scans for minor head injuries
50. Robert Pear, Price Comparisonfor Drugs Is Put on Federal Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2004. The Web site shows, for example, that Zocor, a top-selling Merck product used to treat
high cholesterol, costs an average of $89.38 for a month's supply of 20 milligram tablets. The site
displays several "lower-cost options," including Altoprev ($57.19), made by Andrx
Pharmaceuticals; Lescol ($63.13), sold by Novartis; and Lipitor ($66.08), made by Pfizer. Id.
51. See infra Part V.
52. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 904 (Cal. 1980).
53. Id.
54. The court stated patients must be informed "not only of the 'risks inherent in the
procedure [prescribed, but also] the risks of a decision not to undergo the treatment, and the
probability of a successful outcome of the treatment."' Id. at 906 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d
1, 10 (Cal. 1972)).
55. Smith v. Reisig, 686 P.2d 285, 287 (Okl. 1984).
56. Id. at 288.
57. "Researchers at Dartmouth Medical School, who have been studying Medicare's
performance for three decades, estimate that as much as $1 of every $3 is wasted on unnecessary
or inappropriate care. Other analysts put the figure as high as 40 percent." Gilbert M. Gaul, Bad
Practices Net Hospitals More Money, WASH. POST, July 24, 2005, at A01. Another commentator
notes that "several studies estimate that only 15 to 20 percent of medical practices can be
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provide a helpful example. Around one million people are evaluated
for minor head trauma every year. Fewer than 10 percent of those
who retain a normal level of consciousness have intracranial injuries,
and less than 1 percent require neurosurgical intervention. 58 Even so,
physicians commonly order costly CT scans to rule out rarities. Two
guidelines, the "New Orleans Criteria" and the "Canadian CT Head
Rule", were shown several years ago to be effective in greatly reducing
overuse of CT scans while capturing virtually all of the important
59
population.
Nevertheless, even though just a 20 percent reduction in the
use of CT scans for this purpose would save over $17 million annually
and significantly reduce overcrowding in emergency rooms, 60 these
guidelines have been slow to take hold.
Although somewhat
speculative, it is reasonable to suppose that a number of low-risk
patients-those who have only a bump on the head and no alteration
of consciousness-would not spend hundreds of their dollars on a CT
scan if they were told it has virtually no chance of identifying a real
problem.

justified on the basis of rigorous scientific data establishing their effectiveness." Paul G. Shekelle
et al., The Reproducibility of a Method to Identify the Overuse and Underuse of Medical
Procedures,338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1888, 1888-95 (1998).
Problems with the quality of health care can be categorized as overuse, underuse, and
misuse. A number of studies have demonstrated overuse of health care services; for
example, from 8 to 86 percent of operations - depending on the type - have been
found to be unnecessary and have caused substantial avoidable death and disability.
Underuse is prevalent in the care of patients with chronic disease. For instance, many
patients with diabetes do not have regular glycohemoglobin measurements and retinal
examinations, and from 1993 through 1995, only 14 percent of patients with
cardiovascular disease had achieved the serum lipid levels recommended in national
guidelines. Underuse also occurs in acute care. The failure to use effective therapies
for acute myocardial infarction may lead to as many as 18,000 preventable deaths
each year.
Thomas Bodenheimer, The American Health Care System: The Movement for Improved Quality
in Health Care, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 488, 488 (1999); see also Larry Culpepper & Jane Sisk,
The Development of Practice Guidelines: A Case Study of Otitis Media with Effusion, in PHILLIP
BOYLE, GETTING DOCTORS TO LISTEN: ETHICS AND OUTCOMES DATA IN CONTEXT 77-85 (Phillip

Boyle ed., 1998) (same); Ralph Gonzales et al., DecreasingAntibiotic Use in Ambulatory Practice,
281 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1512 (1999); Mark A. Schuster et al., How Good is the Quality of Health
Care in the United States?, 76 MILBANK Q. 517, 517 (1998) ("[S]tudies strongly suggest that the
care delivered in the United States often does not meet professional standards.").
58. Micelle J. Haydel, Clinical Decision Instruments for CT Scanning in Minor Head Injury,
294 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1551, 1551-53 (2005).

59. The NOC "would have reduced CT use by an estimated 23% and would have identified
100% of patients with intracranial injury," while the CCHR would have reduced CT use by an
estimated 68% and would have identified 100% of patients who required neurosurgical
intervention," although the CCHR would not have detected every instance of patients with less
severe intracranial injury. Id. at 1552.
60. Id. at 1553.
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B. Injury
Like any tort, breach of informed consent requires an injury.
61
In Truman, the patient died from cervical cancer diagnosed too late.
In Smith the patient experienced an inadvertent puncture of her
bladder. 62 Failure to identify medical alternatives or to explain the
importance of the proposed intervention can be a tort when it leads to
medical injuries like these. More interesting is the question of how a
failure to disclose costs can figure as a potential basis for liability. Two
scenarios arise.
In the first, there is no medical injury, just an expense the
patient would not have agreed to incur, had he known how costly the
test or treatment was. He pays for the CT scan that shows,
predictably, his little head bump is just that. If the problem extends
no further, the patient may have an item for small claims court6 3 or
perhaps a complaint under contract, as discussed in Part IV.6 4 In a
variation on this scenario, if the patient can show that this costly test
or treatment was a needless intervention that the physician
recommended just to boost her financial interests, the problem might
be breach of fiduciary duty, addressed in Part 111.65 In still another
variation, if the patient truly needed the intervention and no cheaper
alternative was reasonable, he almost certainly will not have a tort
cause of action. In sum, absent any medical injury, courts are unlikely
to find tortious wrong simply because care is costly or even excessive.
In the second scenario, the patient does suffer a medical injury.
Importantly, that injury need not be caused by medical negligence to
give rise to an informed consent tort. It could simply be a recognized,
non-negligent medical complication. The only requisite is that, had
the patient (or more precisely, a reasonable person in the patient's
situation) known the undisclosed information, he would not have
agreed to the procedure at all, and hence would have avoided the
injury. In this scenario the key question will focus on causality,
discussed just below.
Overall, because breach of informed consent is a negligence tort
requiring an injury, courts are unlikely to recognize failure to disclose
cost information as a stand-alone malpractice tort under breach of
informed consent, where the omission leads to no cognizable non61. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 903 (Cal. 1980).
62. Smith v. Reisig, 686 P.2d 285, 286 (Okl. 1984).
63. See, e.g., Majid v. Stubblefield, 589 N.E.2d 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (physician brought
small claims complaint against patient who refused to pay his bill).
64. See infra Part IV (discussing contract and reasonableness of pricing).
65. See infra Part III (discussing fiduciary duty).
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economic injury. Contractual or fiduciary issues may impinge, but not
tort. However, where a medical injury does occur, a lack of pricing
information could play an interesting role.
C. Causality
In breach of informed consent litigation, causality is ordinarily
evaluated via an objective standard, requiring the jury to find that a
reasonable person in the patient's situation would have refused this
66
intervention had the physician provided the required information.
Where that information concerns costs, the question is whether a
reasonable person in the patient's situation would have refused the
intervention because of its great cost or, more precisely, its anticipated
medical value compared to its high cost. While detailed discussion of
this scenario is beyond the scope of this Article, suffice it to say that
jurors in such a scenario would be treading rather new ground, and
actual verdicts would likely depend on jurors' beliefs about whether
the health care system respects their own needs and financial means.
Jurors might well find for the plaintiff if they believe, first, that the
test or treatment that caused the injury wasn't really necessary and
second, that it was so expensive compared to its projected medical
value that they-as "reasonable people"-would not have deemed it
worth buying out of pocket.
D. Defenses
A very different situation will arise, not where the patient
regrets agreeing to a costly intervention, but rather where she needed
but refused care because of its cost. These cases arise, not from a
failure to disclose costs, but rather from a price disclosure that
prompts the patient to reject the proffered test or treatment. For
many physicians, a nightmare scenario looms in which, despite his
best efforts to educate the patient about the need for treatment, the
risks of refusal, and the medically reasonable alternatives, 67 the
patient still refuses and then suffers harm. 68
66. For further discussion about the objective standard by which causality is determined in
breach of informed consent cases, see E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and
Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. OF HEALTH L. AND POLY 1,

79-85 (2003).
67. Here, the physician's obligation to present viable alternatives becomes especially
pressing. If he has failed to present cheaper, medically acceptable options, then the physician
may well be both factually and legally a cause-a material and substantial factor--of the
patient's decision to reject care and thereby of any injury arising from lack of intervention. If the
patient believed the only option was the one the physician presented, declined it by reason of
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A strong body of case law appears to protect physicians from
liability where patients freely make informed decisions to forego care
because of cost. The primary doctrines are assumption of risk and
contributory negligence/comparative fault. Although the two overlap
to some extent, together they mark a clear statement that patients
cannot shift onto physicians the responsibility for their own wellinformed cost-benefit decisions.
1. Assumption of Risk
"Assumption of risk is the deliberate and voluntary choice to
assume a known risk ....
The doctrine. .. embodies the principle that
one should not be permitted knowingly and voluntarily to incur an
obvious risk of harm and then hold another person responsible for his
injury."69 "The doctrine of assumption of risk lies in the maxim volenti
non fit injuria. Based as it is upon the plaintiffs assent to endure a
situation created by the negligence of the defendant, it relieves the
defendant from performing a duty which might otherwise be owed to
70
the plaintiff."
Assumption of risk comes in several varieties. At the outset,
"express" must be distinguished from "implied."
In express
assumption of risk, the plaintiff and defendant have explicitly agreed,
"in advance, that defendant owes no legal duty to plaintiff and
therefore, that plaintiff cannot recover for injuries caused either by
risks inherent in the situation or by dangers created by defendant's
negligence."'7 1 The plaintiff effectively contracts to 'relieve the
defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his

cost, and concluded he must simply go without care, then the doctor's failure to mention
alternatives may well have been determinative in the patient's decision to forego care.
68. Indeed, Americans are much more likely to forego care due to costs than citizens of
other developed nations. Among those who rate their health as "fair" or "poor" (i.e., those who
may particularly need health care), "[h]alf of sicker adults in the United States said that they did
not see a doctor when sick, did not get recommended treatment, or did not fill a prescription
because of cost." Cathy Schoen et al., Taking the Pulse of Health Care Systems: Experiences of
Patients with Health Problems in Six Countries, HEALTH AFF., Nov. 3, 2005, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.509?ijkeylOnPOyqgRXKAM&ke
ytype=ref&siteid=healthaff.
69. Baxley v. Rosenblum, 400 S.E.2d 502, 507 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); see also Strange v. S.C.
Dep't of Highways, 414 S.E.2d 138, 165 (S.C. 1992) ("Assumption of the risk requires an
intelligent and deliberate choice to assume a known risk. A plaintiff is said to have assumed the
risk as a matter of law when it appears that the plaintiff freely and voluntarily exposed himself
to a known danger and understood and appreciated the danger.").
70. Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 994 (2d Cir. 1987).
71. Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 481 N.E.2d 1037, 1037, 1041 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant
72
is to do or leave undone."'
In health care, the best-known cases on assumption of risk
feature unconventional treatments or clear refusals of conventional
74
73
lifesaving treatments. Both Schneider v. Revici and Boyle v. Revici
featured women with breast cancer who, rejecting conventional
surgery and chemotherapy, sought out Dr. Revici's alternative
treatments. When his dietary regimens failed to arrest the disease
and the patients continued to follow them despite Revici's own urgings
to seek conventional care, the court refused to hold the physician at
fault. These patients' express assumption of risk-which included
explicit information that Revici's remedies were experimental and not
FDA-approved and, in Schneider's case, a written statement that she
understood these facts-was a bar to all recovery.
Similarly, a patient with heel spurs sought podiatric care, then
agreed to surgery but failed to comply with post-surgical care such as
wearing a corrective device. The South Carolina Supreme Court held:
"When a patient seeks treatment by a particular type of practitioner,
he may be held to have assumed the risk of the method of treatment of
75
the particular school of thought chosen."
A Jehovah's Witness's refusal of life-saving blood transfusions
invokes the same principles and will ordinarily exempt the physician

72. Shorter v. Drury, 695 P.2d 116, 122 (Wash. 1985). See generally Sharon W. Murphy,
Contributory Negligence in Medical Malpractice:Are the StandardsChanging to Reflect Society's
Growing Health Care Consumerism?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 141 (1991). Such statements in
which patients simply acknowledge that they have been informed about risks of a particular
treatment and choose to accept them, should not be confused with exculpatory agreements.
Where patients are asked to sign an agreement exculpating a physician for negligence as a
precondition for receiving care, courts generally reject them as against public policy. See, e.g.,
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 411 (Cal. 1963); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564
N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779 (Wash. 1996). In
assessing express assumption of risk, courts have been careful to note that these agreements do
not contravene public policy. E.g., Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y. 1979); Schneider
v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1987); Shorter v. Drury, 695 P.2d 116, 116, 119-20 (Wash.
1985).

In appropriate situations, the parties to a transaction should be able to agree which of
them should bear the risk of injury, even when the injury is caused by a party's legally
culpable conduct. That policy is not altered or undermined by the adoption of
comparative responsibility. Consequently, a valid contractual limitation on liability,
within its terms, creates an absolute bar to a plaintiffs recovery from the other party
to the contract. A valid contractual limitation on liability does not provide an occasion
for the factfinder to assign a percentage of responsibility to any other party or other
person.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. b (2000).

73.
74.
75.

817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987).
961 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1992).
Faile v Bycura, 346 S.E.2d 528, 529-30 (S.C. 1986).
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from liability. In an important caveat, courts have also held that even
though physicians may be exonerated from the direct consequences of
failing to transfuse blood, they are not exempt from liability for other
acts that may have been negligent. In Corlett v. Caserta,76 for
instance, a physician's continued use of aspirin in a patient who had
developed gastrointestinal bleeding was the very thing that occasioned
the need for blood in the first place. The physician was liable for this
error. Similarly, in Shorter v. Drury,77 the gynecologist whose dilation
and curettage procedure caused a severe perforation in the uterus
could be responsible for any negligence in performing the procedure,
even if the patient bore responsibility for her refusal of life-saving
blood.
Express assumption of risk is generally based on contract law,
not tort.78 It is an open agreement that, even though the defendant
might owe the plaintiff certain duties, these are waived so that the
79
patient can pursue other goals of his choosing.
"Implied" assumption of risk differs markedly from "express."
Here, the "plaintiffs willingness to assume a known risk is
determined from the conduct of the parties rather than from an
explicit agreement."8 0 Primary assumption of risk applies where the
plaintiff has assumed the risks inherent in a particular activity, not
created by defendant's negligence.8 1
Examples include high-risk
sports such as skydiving or horseback riding.8 2 In secondary implied
76. 562 N.E.2d 257 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990).
77. 695 P.2d 116 (Wash. 1985).
78. Schneider, 817 F.2d at 994 ("While assumption of risk, like contributory negligence,
barred recovery, it was predicated on a theory of contract rather than on a theory of culpable
conduct: the plaintiffs agreement, either express or implied, to absolve the defendant from
responsibility."); Shorter, 695 P.2d at 119-20; Colton v. N.Y. Hosp., 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 876 (N.Y.
1979).
79. As noted by the Second Circuit in Schneider:
[We see no reason why a patient should not be allowed to make an informed decision
to go outside currently approved medical methods in search of an unconventional
treatment. While a patient should be encouraged to exercise care for his own safety,
we believe that an informed decision to avoid surgery and conventional chemotherapy
is within the patient's right to determine what shall be done with his own body.
817 F.2d at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 481 N.E.2d 1037, 1037-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
81. Id. at 1038.
The primary label has been applied to situations where a plaintiff has assumed
known risks inherent in a particular activity or situation. The assumed risks there are
not those created by defendant's negligence but rather by the nature of the activity
itself. Thus, primary implied assumption of risk is, arguably, not a true negligence
defense since no cause of action for negligence is ever alleged.
Id. at 1041; see also Shorter, 695 P.2d at 122.
82. In some states, implied assumption of risk completely collapses into comparative fault.
See, e.g., Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986).
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assumption of risk, the plaintiff implicitly assumes the risks of the
defendant's negligence. It is functionally similar to, and has now been
essentially collapsed into, contributory negligence or comparative
83
fault.
2. Contributory Negligence and Comparative Fault
Whereas express assumption of risk is founded on contract,
contributory negligence operates in tort.8 4 Formerly operating as a
complete bar to recovery, contributory negligence has now evolved into
a comparative fault doctrine in which the patient assumes whatever
85
portion of blame rightly attaches to his or her conduct.
Courts have been entirely willing to apply the doctrine. In
Baxley v. Rosenblum8 6 the patient, himself a physician, initially saw a
urologist for painful, bloody urination. Baxley declined to follow the
urologist's advice.
When his symptoms worsened under selftreatment, Baxley saw a non-urologist physician and then declined to
follow the latter's recommendations. The South Carolina appellate
court held that "one should not be permitted knowingly and

83. Duffy, 481 N.E.2d at 1038, 1041.
84.
The doctrine of contributory negligence embodies the principle that an injured person
should not be permitted to ask from others greater care than he himself exercises for
his own welfare. If in the exercise of ordinary care, the plaintiff might have avoided
the consequences of defendant's negligence, he is author of his own injury in the eyes
of the law.
Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs. of Greenville., 498 S.E.2d 395, 402 (S.C. App. 1998) (quoting
Wallace v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 389 S.E.2d 155, 157 (S.C. App. 1989)). Otherwise stated,
Contributory negligence is a lack of ordinary care on the part of a person injured by
the negligence of another which combines and contributes to the injury as a proximate
cause without which the injury would not have occurred. ....
A plaintiff who fails to
exercise ordinary care for his own welfare is the author of his own injury in the eyes of
the law.
Baxley v. Rosenblum, 400 S.E.2d 502, 506 (S.C. App. 1991). Technically, "contributory
negligence" often refers to the doctrine that states that if the plaintiff bears any responsibility
whatever for his adverse outcome, his negligence poses a complete bar to recovery against the
defendant. In all but a few states, this stringent limitation has been replaced by the doctrine of
"comparative fault," which states that each party is to be responsible according to its own degree
of fault. E.g., DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOcIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 272-77 (5th ed. 2005). Nevertheless,

"contributory negligence" is often used in a more generic sense to refer simply to the plaintiffs
negligence in contributing to his own injury, whether the consequence is to bar or merely to

diminish his recovery. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 451 (5th ed. 2005).

85. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 994 (2d Cir. 1987); Eaton v McLain, 891
S.W.2d 587, 592 (Tenn. 1994); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992); Shorter, 695
P.2d at 119; Hawkins, 498 S.E.2d at 396; Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257, 261 (Ill. App. 1
Dist. 1990); Duffy, 481 N.E.2d at 1041; Murphy, supra note 72, at 160.
86. 400 S.E.2d 502 (S.C. App. 1991).
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voluntarily to incur an obvious risk of harm and then hold another
87
person responsible for his injury."
The failure to make recommended follow-up visits also figured
8 8 According to the District of Columbia
in Forman v. Pillsbury.
court,
a mother who failed to bring her child in for scheduled blood
monitoring could not blame the physician for her own failure to adhere
to medical recommendations.
Refusing diagnostic work-up of breast lumps has likewise been
deemed contributory negligence,8 9 as has failure to appear for followup care after elective abortion. 90
Other cases follow the same
9
1
pattern.
In some instances, the patient appeared directly to cause
his problem, while in others the patient failed to take reasonable
actions to mitigate an injury caused by the physician. 92 Notably,
juries can find contributory negligence even if the defendant does not
93
offer that as a defense.

87. Baxley, 400 S.E.2d at 507. The court went on: "In this case, the evidence permitted a
reasonable inference that Baxley voluntarily chose to incur known medical risks." Id.
88. Forman v. Pillsbury, 753 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1990).
89. Chudson v. Ratra, 548 A.2d 172 (Md. App. 1988), cert. denied, 552 A.2d 894 (Md. 1988);
Grippe v. Momtazee, 705 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. App. 1986).
90. Sorina v. Armstrong, 554 N.E.2d 943 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
91. See, e.g., Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1988) (injured man returned to strenuous
work early, in contravention of medical instructions, causing his wounds to reopen); Ostrowski v.
Azzara, 545 A.2d 148 (N.J. 1988) (patient failed to mitigate the damages of podiatrist's poor
choice of treatment, as her continued smoking and poor glucose control made healing more
difficult); Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985) (patient who developed decubitous ulcers
(bedsores) failed to tell her doctor about this worsening problem); Meacham v. McLeay, 227
N.W.2d 829 (Neb. 1975) (patient's early departure from hospital and failure to appear for followup care delayed her diagnosis and exacerbated her condition); Musachia v. Rosman, 190 So. 2d
47 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966) (patient's failure to follow recommendations for rest and proper diet after
injury meant patient could be contributorily negligent); Graze v. Lawless, 389 N.E.2d 957 (Ill.
App. 3 Dist. 1979) (patient with chest pains insisted, contrary to his doctor's urging for
immediate hospitalization, that he could drive himself to the hospital after taking care of some
personal business); Seymour v. Victory Mem. Hosp., 376 N.E.2d 754 (Ill App. 2 Dist. 1978)
(patient smoked in bed against explicit rule to the contrary, setting it afire); Shinholster v.
Annapolis Hosp., 685 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. 2004) (patient's failure to take prescribed blood
pressure medication for at least a year prior to her visits to the emergency room was admissible
evidence of patient's comparative negligence in her eventual death from "mini-strokes").
92. "[A] plaintiff has a duty to mitigate the damages resulting from a defendant's
negligence." Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257, 261 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1990). At the same time,
there are limits to patients' obligations to mitigate damages. Major surgery, for instance, appears
to be clearly over the line. See Montgomery v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 392 N.E.2d 77, 81 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979) (quoting Rosenstein v. Chi. Transit Auth., 299 N.E.2d 396 (Ill. App. 1973) ("It is clear
that an injured person has no duty to undergo surgery to mitigate his damages.")).
93. Reikes, 471 So. 2d at 386.
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3. Recommendations
Courts do not generally allow patients to foist onto physicians
the consequences of their own decisions. As pointed out by the
Nebraska Supreme Court, to hold a physician liable for his patient's
decisions, "we would be required to say that [the physician] had a
duty, in some indefinable method by coercion, threats, or pressure to
prevail upon the plaintiff to report back to him and the hospital for the
further necessary tests to complete the diagnosis." 94 The court further
noted, "[a] doctor cannot compel a patient to come to the office for
treatment, nor can a doctor force a patient to follow his
recommendations outside the office. In fact, few patients would
appreciate the type of paternalistic intrusiveness plaintiffs proposed
95
rule requires."
Nevertheless, certain responsibilities appear incumbent upon
physicians. Assumption of risk and contributory negligence both
presuppose a well-informed patient: "without clear proof of totally
informed consent, the defense of assumption of risk is not
successful. '96 Accordingly, a physician who hopes to use these as
defenses when patients refuse interventions because of cost, must
provide ample information to patients-the importance of the
intervention, the hazards of refusal, the alternatives, and perhaps
94. Meacham, 227 N.W.2d at 832.
95. Forman, 753 F. Supp. at 19. As further noted by the Second Circuit in Schneider:
[We see no reason why a patient should not be allowed to make an informed decision
to go outside currently approved medical methods in search of an unconventional
treatment. While a patient should be encouraged to exercise care for his own safety,
we believe that an informed decision to avoid surgery and conventional chemotherapy
is within the patient's right to determine what shall be done with his own body.
Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Murphy, supra note 72, at 162. Murphy goes on to observe:
The health care crisis of recent years resulted in increased consumer activism and
awareness of health care issues. Courts appear to be cognizant of this increasing
consumer awareness and as a result are willing to hold a patient to a higher degree of
responsibility for his own HC decisions. Thus, a patient's refusal to exercise due care
to protect his own health needs is more likely to be found the proximate cause of a
resultant harm. Accordingly, an injured patient can no longer rely on the requirement
that his own negligence occurred concurrently with the physician's negligence. It
appears that as health care consumers become more aware and involved in health
care issues, there will be a corresponding increase in the degree of responsibility a
patient will be required to assume in his own health care decisions. Because the
disparity between the patient's and the physician's knowledge is diminishing,
absolute trust in the physician's judgment is no longer justified in all cases. In a
society concerned with health care issues, courts may increasingly demand individual
responsibility for health care decisions. As noted by the Maryland Court of Appeals,
"[t]o adopt the view that it is not negligent for [patients to ignore symptoms] that are
obvious to them would defy medical reality and thus be absurd."
Chudson v. Ratra, 548 A.2d 172, 183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), cert. denied, 552 A.2d 894 (Md.
1988).

1232

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4:1207

also, when feasible, the available financing options.
Equally
important, the physician should document such discussions carefully.
Indeed, in at least some instances where a patient refuses care by
reason of cost, it may be appropriate to invite him to sign a form akin
to the "A.M.A." ("against medical advice") form that patients who want
to leave a hospital prematurely are asked to sign.
III. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. Defining Fiduciaries
The foregoing discussion suggested that physicians may have a
duty to disclose the costs of their own professional services and to
know, within at least a rough range, the anticipated costs for the most
common services or products they might prescribe. 97 Nevertheless,
finding a legally cognizable injury, for purposes of tort, is difficult
when there is no physical injury but only unwanted economic cost.
The absence of physical injury raises two scenarios for discussion. 98
First, if an allegedly needless test or treatment is part of a broader
pattern of prescribing needless interventions to enhance the
physician's financial or other interests, the issue may be breach of
fiduciary duty. Second, even if the patient needed the intervention,
excessive pricing may sound in contract. The former issue will be
addressed in this Part, and the latter in Part IV.
We need not discuss in depth the nature of a fiduciary
relationship and its bearing on the physician-patient relationship, for
that is accomplished elsewhere in this issue by Professor Mehlman. 9 9
A brief summary will suffice.
As Professor DeMott has noted, "Fiduciary obligation is one of
the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American law."' 00 It arose initially
in the law of trust, in which a trustee holds property for the benefit of
another party. Over time it expanded to include agency, in which one
person represents another, again for promoting the latter's interests.

97. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussion of costs).
98. See supra Part II.B (discussion of injury).
99. For broader discussion, see E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary:
Discardinga Misguided Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 586, 586-98 (2005); E. Haavi Morreim,
Economic Disclosure & Economic Advocacy: New Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J.
Legal Med. 275, 275-379 (1991).
100. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of FiduciaryObligation, 1998 DUKE
L.J. 879, 879 (1998).
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Its subsequent development encompassed other relationships, such as
partners, directors and officers, executors, attorneys, and priests. 10 1
Shepherd identifies three traditional classifications. 10 2 From
the law of trusts comes the property-holder who holds, manages, or
controls property to benefit the beneficiary. Next is the representative,
a concept from the law of agency in which the agent stands as the
representative or surrogate of the principal, acting on his behalf for
the sake of the latter's betterment. Finally, based on the law of undue
influence, is the adviser. An adviser can become a fiduciary by
providing advice and expertise on which the advisee needs to rely. Yet
the bare fact that one person decides to trust another's judgment does
not, of itself, create a fiduciary bond. Certain other conditions must
also be met.
Although it is debatable whether physicians are
fiduciaries in the strictest sense, 103 many courts have found it to be
05
such, 104 and is best understood within the "adviser" category.

101. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991); Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795 (1983); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37
CAL. L. REV. 539, 555 (1949); see also Scott v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB, 886 F. Supp. 1073,
1078 (S.D.N.Y 1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122 (1997);
Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio 2002); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 735
(Tenn. 1998); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990); Lockett v.
Goodill 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 860-61 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974), affld, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975); Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640, 646 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1997);
Calhoun v. Rane, 599 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1992); Coughlin v. SeRine, 507 N.E.2d 505
(Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1987); Collins v. Nugent, 443 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1982).
102. JAY C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 21 (1981).
103. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligationsin a ChangingHealth Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 241-57 (1995).
104. A host of case law supports the notion that physicians are fiduciaries, or at least in a
relationship of trust and confidence. See, e.g., Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio
2002); McCall v Pacificare of Cal., Inc., 21 P.3d 1189 (Cal. 2001); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990); Shadrick, 963 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1998); Benton v. Snyder,
825 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tenn. 1992); Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989); McCloud v. Seier,
567 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1978); Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246 (Wash. 1980); Gates v.
Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979); Lockett, 430 P.2d 587 (Wash. 1967); Tighe v. Ginsberg, 540
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1989); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982); Roy v. Hartogs, 366
N.Y.S.2d 297 (1975); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101, 1103 (Kan. 1960); Bowman v.
McPheeters, 176 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. 1947); Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216 (N.M. App. 1997);
Brandt v. Med. Def. Assoc., 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. Ct. App. 1977); Miller, 522 P.2d at 86061 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975); Hunter v. Brown, 484 P.2d 1162
(Wash. Ct. App. 1971), afl'd, 502 P.2d 1194 (Wash. 1972); Mason v. Ellsworth, 474 P.2d 909,
917-18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952 (Ill. App. 1
Dist. 1986); Berkey v. Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 77-78 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1969); Wohlgemuth v.
Meyer, 293 P.2d 816 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1956); Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 18 F.Supp.2d 786 (M.D.
Tenn. 1998); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801-01 (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Murphy v. Godwin, 303 A.2d 668 (Del. Super. 1973).
105. SHEPHERD, supra note 102, at 29.

1234

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4:1207

Across all three classifications, virtually all fiduciaries share a
fairly distinctive set of features.
Fiduciaries invariably have
discretion and power. In order to manage property, to represent
someone, or to advise, the fiduciary must have sufficient leeway to
make the kinds of judgments that can, in fact, promote the best
1 06
interests of the beneficiary.
Because the fiduciary has this power and because it is usually
difficult, if not impossible, for the beneficiary to monitor the fiduciary's
performance, 10 7 the fiduciary has a significant opportunity to exploit
the latter's vulnerability for her own gain. That is, the same power
and discretion that enable her to do her job also enable her to exploit
the very one whose benefit she should promote. For this reason, the
law imposes the strongest duty of loyalty. "A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
10 8
standard of behavior."
By implication, the physician must not exploit the patient to
promote his own gain. He must not enter into avoidable conflicts of
interest that would pit his own welfare against the patient's or, when
unavoidable, he must disclose such conflicts of interest and permit the
106. "If the relationship, as the parties structure it, does not confer discretion on the
'fiduciary,' then his actions are not subject to the fiduciary constraint. Even a designated 'trustee'
may not be a fiduciary if he entirely lacks authority and thus has no discretionary power."
DeMott, supra note 100, at 901. In sum, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has noted that the
central purpose of fiduciary law is to govern the exercise of discretion in making decisions that
are not, and cannot be, controlled in advance by legal means." Peter J. Jacobson & Michael T.
Cahill, Applying Fiduciary Responsibilities in the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED.
155, 160 (2000). As noted by Rodwin, fiduciaries usually "have specialized knowledge or
expertise. Their work requires judgment and discretion." Rodwin, supra note 103, at 244; see also
Cooter & Freedman, supra note 101, at 1046, 1048-49 (explaining that the beneficiary/fiduciary
relationship is not governed by "specific rules that dictate how the fiduciary should manage the
asset," but rather "the fiduciary's responsibilities are open-ended"); Frankel, supra note 101, at
810 (explaining that "[tihe delegated power that enables the fiduciary to benefit the entrustor
also enables him to injure the entrustor").
107. "Often the party that the fiduciary serves cannot effectively monitor the fiduciary's
performance. The fiduciary relationship is based on dependence, reliance, and trust." Rodwin,
supra note 103, at 244.
108. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). See also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr.,
Judicial Review of FiduciaryDecisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV.
1, 3 (1986).
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines agency as a "fiduciary relationship" in
which the agent [has] ...a duty "to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all
matters connected with his agency." Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
defines a trust as a "fiduciary relationship with respect to property," with the trustee
being under a duty "to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary."
Id. at 25. As similarly noted by Shepherd, "[a] fiduciary relationship exists whenever any person
acquires a power of any type on condition that he also receive with it a duty to utilize that power
in the best interests of another." SHEPHERD, supra note 102, at 35, 93.
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patient to decide whether he may continue as physician-fiduciary.109
Across fiduciary relationships this obligation is so strong that, if the
beneficiary can prove that his fiduciary is in a conflict of interest, the
law will presume that the fiduciary abused his power or exploited the
beneficiary, and thereby will place on the fiduciary the burden of
proving he did not. 110 As Professor Mehlman notes, penalties for
breach of fiduciary duty can go beyond restitution to include punitive
damages. 111
B. Opportunitiesfor Breach of FiduciaryDuty
Practicing physicians cannot entirely escape conflicts of
interest. Every form of compensation creates the potential to serve
oneself rather than the patient. Fee-for-service can encourage too
many services and excessive fees; capitation"1 2 can reward
withholding services; and salary can encourage the physician to see as
few patients as possible, promptly closing the doors at 5:00 p.m.
Hence, it has always been possible for patients to raise
questions about physician loyalty. Many concerns were raised, for
instance, about the conflicts embedded in managed care arrangements
such as capitation. 113 Fee-for-service conflicts are more long-standing
109. "Fiduciary law creates a cluster of presumptive rules of conduct compendiously
described as the duty of loyalty. The obligations comprising this duty restrict the permissible
scope of a fiduciary's behavior whenever possible conflicts of interest arise between the principal
and the fiduciary." Cooter & Freedman, supra note 101, at 1053-54. "Other rules of fiduciary
conduct include, for example, the rule against conflicts of duty, the rule against self-interested
transactions, the rule against bribes and secret commissions, the rule against purchasing trust
property, and the rule regarding fiduciary opportunities." Id. at 1053 n.19; see also Frankel,
supra note 101, at 824; Rodwin, supra note 103, at 244; SHEPHERD, supranote 102, at 41.
110. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 101, at 1048; DeMott, supra note 100, at 900; Angela R.
Holder, Do Researchers and Subjects Have a Fiduciary Relationship?, 4 IRB 6 (Jan. 1982);
AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 40 (Little, Brown & Co. 3rd ed. 1967).
111. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1137 (2006).
112. Payment by capitation typically involves paying the physician a flat amount, per
patient per month, to provide any services needed within a designated range. For instance, the
physician might be obligated to provide all professional, laboratory, and x-ray services up to
$5,000, after which the health plan assumes responsibility.
113. Lawsuits challenging managed care incentives include: Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1299 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999); Paul v. Humana Med.
Plan, Inc., 682 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Shea v. Esensten, 622 N.W.2d 130 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Varol v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 160
Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196 (1st
Cir. 1997); Cruz v. Pacificare Health Sys., Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001),
superseded by 34 P.3d 288 (Cal. 2001), rev'd in part, affd in part, 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003); see
also David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Problems with Punitive Damages in Lawsuits
Against Managed-Care Organizations,342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 280 (2000); Edward B. Hirshfeld.
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and, if more obvious, have been less worrisome to patients so long as
an insurer paid for any potentially excessive services or fees. That
may change, however. When patients pay far more of their own bills
under CDHPs, they may pay far more attention to such issues.
A California court of appeals captured the issue well in
discussing patient's vulnerability when his physician owns the
pharmacy from which he buys his medications:
The doctor dictates what brand the patient is to buy.., orders the amount of drugs and
prescribes the quantity to be consumed. In other words, the patient is a captive
consumer. There is no other profession or business where a member thereof can dictate
to a consumer what brand he must buy, what amount he must buy, and how fast he
must consume it and how much he must pay with the further condition to the consumer
that any failure to fully comply must be at the risk of his own health. If the doctor
interferes with the patient's free choice as to where he purchases his prescribed
medicine, the patient
then becomes a totally captive consumer and the doctor has a
114
complete monopoly.

In Strauss v. Biggs,115 for instance, a patient claimed not only
that the podiatrist failed to do the procedure he promised and caused
her harm by botching the services he did perform, but that out of
greed he was running a "podiatric mill" and sending bogus bills to
insurers such as hers. 116 The Delaware Supreme Court held that
punitive damages were warranted. 117 Although breach of fiduciary
duty was not listed as a cause of action in this case, it has potential
where the patient, rather than the insurer, pays the bills.
In other cases, a physician might attempt dubious tactics to
recoup revenues lost to managed care constraints.
In one
arrangement recently disclosed, some physicians developed "revenue
sharing" relationships with clinical laboratories, in which the
physician reaps substantial profits from each specimen he sends. The
lab might charge the doctor $30 to analyze a skin biopsy, for instance,

Should Third Party Payors of Health Care Services Disclose Cost Control Mechanisms to
Potential Beneficiaries, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 115 (1990); S. Fred Figa & Howard M. Tag,
Redefining Full and FairDisclosure of HMO Benefits and Limitations, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
151 (1990); Linda V. Tiano, The Legal Implications of HMO Cost Containment Measures, 14
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 79 (1990); William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed
Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451 (1991); Norman Daniels, Why
Saying No to Patients in the United States is So Hard: Cost Containment, Justice, and Provider
Autonomy, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1380 (1986); CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES:
PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (Am. Enterprise Inst. Press 1995);
Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of Patient Empowerment in the Managed
Care Setting, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (1998).
114. Magan Med. Clinic v. California State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1967).
115. 525 A.2d 992 (Del. 1987).
116. Id. at 998, 1000.
117. Id. at 1000-01.
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while the physician then receives $109. Markups can reach 700
percent. 118 The potential for exploitation is obvious, whether via
needless biopsies or other lab analyses, or via sending specimens to
the profitable lab regardless of whether its quality is acceptable.1 9
Similarly, some physicians have brought sophisticated imaging
equipment into their offices.1 20 According to one report, medical
imaging services have risen at a rate three times faster than overall
physician services, and costs have risen commensurately.1 21 "National
Imaging Associates estimates from its own experience that about onethird of advanced imaging tests are either inappropriate for the
medical problem at hand, or don't contribute to a doctor's diagnoses or
a patient's outcome," and that many of the imaging facilities based in
physicians' offices may not measure up to quality standards either for
1 22
equipment or for the qualifications of those reading the scans.
Evidence from the 1990s indicated that when physicians have
an ownership interest in imaging facilities or other ancillary services
to which they refer their own patients, overutilization, overpricing,
poorer quality of care, and reduced overall access to these services can
result.1 23 A 1989 report by the Department of Health and Human
118. D. Armstrong, How Some Doctors Turn a $79 Profit From a $30 Test: Physician Groups
Add Markup To Work Done by Others, Despite Ethics Concerns Administrative Costs Cited, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
119. Armstrong describes an instance in which a physician sent a skin sample to a
laboratory across the country, whose owner had once been director of a lab the state called a
threat to public health. Id.
120. As noted by Ginsburg and Grossman, "more-sophisticated services such as magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) and other high-end imaging ... have been brought into physician
practices to an increasing degree." Paul B. Ginsburg & Joy M. Grossman, When the Price Isn't
Right: How Inadvertent Payment Incentives Drive Medical Care, HEALTH AFF., Aug. 9 2005,
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.376vl.
121. V. Fuhrmans, Overuse of Medical Scans is Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, D1.
122. Id.
123. "Service use also is likely to increase because more care is being provided in settings
where physician self-referral incentives come into play. Research shows that physician referrals
are much higher when physicians have an ownership interest in the facility." Ginsburg &
Grossman, supra note 120. The Florida Cost Containment study alleged widespread problems of
overutilization, overpricing, reduced access, and poorer quality of care, particularly in the areas
of clinical laboratories, diagnostic imaging, physical therapy, and rehabilitation centers. STATE
OF FLORIDA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT BOARD, JOINT VENTURES AMONG HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS IN FLORIDA (Aug. 1991); Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Physician Ownership of
Physical Therapy Services: Effects on Charges, Utilization, Profits and Service Characteristics,
268 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2055 (1992) (concluding that "utilization, charges per patient, and profits
are higher when physical therapy and rehabilitation facilities are owned by referring
physicians"). Admittedly, such studies do not purport to define the comprehensive national
picture, and they have been subject to substantial methodological criticism. Otis White, Where
Business Has Turned Against Doctors, MED. ECON., Oct. 5, 1992, at 52 (criticizing Florida's ban
on self-referral). Still, they have fueled great concern about the hazards of physician investment
and self-referral.
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Services ("DHHS") Office of Inspector General ("OIG") found, in those
days before the Stark anti-self-referral legislation, 124 that Medicare
patients referred to facilities in which their physicians had an interest
received 45 percent more clinical laboratory services and 13 percent
patients. 125
than other Medicare
more physiologic testing
Importantly, although the Stark laws1 26 and regulations prohibit selfreferral to free-standing facilities, they do not regulate physicians who
bring those same technologies into their offices.
Perhaps the least recognized, yet most pervasive conflict of
interest is defensive medicine, defined as "deviation from sound
127
medical practice that is induced primarily by a threat of liability."
Although some forms of defensive medicine do not directly generate
extra costs-as, for instance, when a physician stops accepting highrisk patients or stops practicing in high-risk areas such as obstetricsmore common forms involve positive behaviors such as medically
unnecessary tests, stronger treatments than needed, referrals to
specialists, or invasive procedures that may actually be against
professional judgment. By one recent estimate, some 92 percent of
physicians engage in such "assurance behavior." 128 The cost is said to
129
range into billions of dollars.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
125. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OAl-1288.01410, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES:

REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (1989). Similarly, in a 1990 survey of in-office radiologic testing,
Hillman and colleagues discovered that for several common procedures, physicians who had inoffice equipment ordered four times as many studies, and ran costs up to seven times higher,
than physicians who referred their patients to an independent radiologist. Bruce J. Hillman et
al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office Practice-A Comparison of Self,
Referring and Radiologist-ReferringPhysicians, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1604, 1604 (1990). In
1992, the same research group examined a broader range of clinical presentations with specific
respect to a mostly elderly, chronically ill population. They concluded that in-office self-referral
resulted in 1.7 to 7.7 times more frequent performance of radiologic imaging procedures and, for
office-based (as distinct from hospital-based) imaging procedures, self-referring radiologists
generally charged substantially more per episode of medical care than independent radiologists.
Bruce J. Hillman et al., Physicians' Utilization and Charges for Outpatient DiagnosticImaging
in a Medicare Population, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2050, 2050 (1992); see also Jeffery H.
Burkhardt & Jonathan H. Sunshine, Utilization of Radiologic Services in Different Payment
Systems and PatientPopulations,200 RADIOLOGY 202 (1996).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
127. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in
a Volatile MalpracticeEnvironment, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2609, 2609 (2005).
128. Id. at 2612, 2616 (finding that fifty-nine percent of survey respondents "often ordered
more diagnostic tests than were medically indicated," fifty-two percent "often referred patients to
other specialists in unnecessary circumstances," and thirty-three percent "often prescrib[ed]
more medications than were medically indicated" and "suggest[ed] invasive procedures which, in
their professional judgment, were unwarranted").
129. One estimate pegged the cost of defensive medicine at $13.7 billion per year. Roger A.
Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2776, 2778,
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Here, too, the conflict of interest is obvious. To protect himself
against some hypothetical legal threat his patient might pose, the
physician undertakes interventions that, by definition, do not promote
the patient's benefit. Under CDHPs with high deductibles, many
more of these will be paid for by patients rather than insurers. If
patients believe they have paid for essentially useless care-perhaps
even exacerbating medical risks 13 0- some may cry foul. At this point,
breach of fiduciary duty becomes a potential cause of action. The
question then is whether courts will be receptive.
C. JudicialResponses to Breach of FiduciaryDuty
Many courts have agreed that the physician-patient
relationship is fiduciary, or at least a relationship of trust and
confidence. 13 1 Most of these cases, however, focus on establishing
physicians' duties toward patients, particularly in the area of
informed consent. Far scanter is the case law addressing whether
physicians can be liable for breach of fiduciary duty.
One prominent case in which a court was willing to hold a
physician liable for breach of fiduciary duty is Moore v. Regents of the
University of California.13 2 The physician who removed a patient's
spleen for therapeutic purposes discerned that the patient's cells could
be developed into a lucrative cell line. Thereafter, he told the patient

2781 (1987) (explaining that, although under one method of calculation medical professional
liability costs are estimated to be $13.7 billion and under yet another they are thought to be only
$8.4 billion, the authors prefer an estimate of $12.1 billion); see also Randall Bovbjerg, The
Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375,
1397 (1975) (stating, "that many insured fee-for-service providers do in fact often provide too
much care and take too many precautions" which is "most obviously illustrated by the prevalence
of 'unnecessary' surgical or other procedures, including 'defensive' medicine"); Stephen
Zuckerman, Medical Malpractice: Claims, Legal Costs, and the Practiceof Defensive Medicine, 3
HEALTH AFF. 128, 128 (1984) (stating that "[t]he combined impact of increases in both the
frequency of suits and the size of awards has led to a situation in which malpractice insures
incurred underwriting losses of almost $750 million in 1983"). The Office of Technology
Assessment recently concluded that up to eight percent of diagnostic testing is "consciously
defensive," while another study proposed that liability reform might save up to $50 billion per
year without compromising outcomes. Richard E. Anderson, Billions for Defense: The Pervasive
Nature of Defensive Medicine, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2399, 2399 (1999) (citing Kessler &
McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine, 11 Q.J. ECON. 353 (1996)). Anderson also
argues that, aside from defensive medicine that goes beyond the standard of care, that standard
itself is inflated by defensive medicine.
130. Where invasive procedures such as biopsies are done for defensive reasons, patients are
exposed to increased medical risk, not just costs. Even extra diagnostic testing can be harmful
where a false positive result leads to a cascade of further, riskier, testing. See Studdert et al.,
supranote 127, at 2616.
131. See supra note 112.
132. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 936 (1992).
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to return repeatedly from his home in Seattle to the physician's office
in Los Angeles-under the ruse that it was for his benefit-so that the
physician could continue to gather various tissue samples for research
133
and commercial purposes.
Finding that the patient had a cause of action both for breach
of fiduciary duty and for breach of informed consent, the California
Supreme Court held:
The law already recognizes that a reasonable patient would want to know whether a
physician has an economic interest that might affect the physician's professional
judgment. As the Court of Appeal has said, '[clertainly a sick patient deserves to be free
of any reasonable suspicion that his doctor's judgment is influenced by a profit
motive.'... Accordingly, we hold that a physician who is seeking a patient's consent for
a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the
patient's informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment. 134

As noted above in Strauss v. Biggs,13 5 courts have also been willing to
impose punitive damages when they find a physician has exploited a
patient with unnecessary procedures and bogus billing.136
Courts, however, are far from unanimous.
In D.A.B. v.
Brown,137 physicians who prescribed synthetic growth hormone failed
to reveal that they were receiving kickbacks from the drug's
manufacturer. Once the physicians were convicted in federal court for
violation of anti-kickback laws, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, breach
of fiduciary duty and conspiracy to commit breach of fiduciary duty.
The Minnesota appellate court rejected this formulation of the issues,
holding that the complaint sounded in malpractice, not breach of
fiduciary duty, because the physicians' actions involved "medical
diagnosis, treatment, and care of the patients. ' 13 The court noted
that this complaint did not allege that the patients' treatment was
improper or resulted in any harm, 139 and it explicitly declined to
recognize breach of fiduciary duty as a new tort in the physicianpatient relationship:
While we agree that a physician's advice about treatment options should be free from
self-serving financial considerations, any cause of action based on that conduct

133. Although the California Supreme Court denied that the taking of these tissues
constituted a claim for conversion of property, it did find that plaintiff stated a valid cause of
action for a breach of fiduciary duty and of the duty to obtain informed consent. Id. at 480.
134. Id, at 483, 485.
135. 525 A.2d 992 (Del. 1987).
136. It can be noted, however, that the Strauss complaint did not include breach of fiduciary
duty. Nevertheless, the complaint has the essential elements of a fiduciary claim-vulnerability
of the patient, exploitation by the party who has superior power, and the like.
137. 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
138. Id. at 171.
139. Id.
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necessarily flows from the therapeutic relationship. Any breach of fiduciary duty that
may have occurred during the doctor's prescription of medication to his patients
arose
14 0
while the doctor was examining, diagnosing, treating, or caring for his patients.

Because there was no allegation of injury relating to conduct and the
complaint was filed after the two-year statute of limitations, the court
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim. 141 The
court also upheld dismissal of complaints that the defendants had
violated the state's consumer fraud act, because plaintiffs had alleged
no injury. 142
In Neade v. Portes,'43 an HMO physician who declined to
authorize an angiogram for a patient with chest pain also failed to
disclose the financial incentives encouraging him to limit treatment.
The patient's estate sued for medical negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty. Reversing the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that, although the state's courts recognize a fiduciary
relationship between physician and patient, 44 the claim concerning
45
fiduciary duty was duplicative of the medical malpractice claim.'
The operative facts and the injury were the same in both claims,
namely, the failure to order an angiogram and Mr. Neade's death.
Because "operative facts together with the injury ... determine
whether a cause of action is duplicative," the court found the breach of
fiduciary duty claim to be a "re-presentment" of the medical
negligence claim. 46 At most, the physician's incentives might be
47
evidence to show bias if the physician were to testify at trial.
The Neade court did not close the door on the possibility of a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in the physician-patient
context, noting simply that the court had never addressed it and did

140. Id. at 172.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 172-73.
143. 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000).
144. Id. at 500.
145. Id. at 502. The court pointed out that:
In order to sustain a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Dr. Portes, plaintiff would
have to allege, inter alia, that: (1) had she known of the Medical Incentive Fund she
would have sought an opinion from another physician; (2) that the other physician
would have ordered an angiogram for Mr. Neade; (3) that the angiogram would have
detected Mr. Neade's heart condition; and (4) that treatment could have prevented his
eventual myocardial infarction and subsequent death.
Id. at 503. These elements, the court concluded, were the very things the plaintiff would have to
prove to establish malpractice-hence the two are duplicative. See also Spoor v. Serota, 852 P.2d
1292 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty as duplicative of negligence
claim).
146. Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 502.
147. Id. at 506.
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not need to do so here, since the claim was dismissed as duplicative.' 48
The court did observe, in dicta, that creating "a new cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty against a physician in these circumstances
would be impractical,"'149 since physicians often work for many HMOs
with differing structures and incentive arrangements.
Neither of these decisions is fatal to the idea that patients who
pay for their care out of their HSAs or pockets could have a legally
cognizable claim for breach of fiduciary duty when they are exploited
by physicians in undisclosed conflicts of interest. In both cases, the
courts were troubled by the lack of any injury that was specifically
and uniquely connected to the fiduciary duty, sufficient to permit a
distinct claim to go forward. In D.A.B., there was no injury at all,
while in Neade, the injury was already covered by the malpractice
claim. Yet both courts seemed to leave open the possibility that there
could be such a claim under some circumstances.
In D.A.B., for example, the court explicitly noted that plaintiffs
could not show any economic injury-no indication that their
insurance premiums or co-payments had increased due to the
physicians' actions, or that they paid a higher price than they would
have from some other drug supplier. 150 In so doing, the court seems to
leave open the possibility that an economic injury could suffice.
Although this court did not find an injury for plaintiffs whose
expenses were already insured, presumably an injury might be found
where patients must pay out of pocket-perhaps, for instance, for
costly tests sent to a lab that gives the physician a large profit, or
maybe for a medically needless, costly CT scan for a minor head bump,
ordered simply to insulate the physician against potential malpractice
litigation. The Neade court might likewise accept such economic
injuries, since they do not duplicate malpractice claims.
In sum, where a physician uses her superior power to promote
her own interests over the patient's and in the process causes
distinctly identifiable harms, courts may be willing to move beyond
their current recognition that physicians' duties are founded in a
fiduciary kind of relationship, to follow the Moore court and find
liability for breaches of fiduciary duty. 15 1

148. Id. at 500.
149. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
150. 570 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
151. For arguments proposing that tort injuries might legitimately be expanded to
encompass certain sorts of "dignitary torts," see Morreim, supranote 66, at 78-85.
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CONTRACT LAW

A curious combination of tort and contract-"contorts"-guides
the physician-patient relationship.1 52 Although medical injuries are
usually addressed in tort, the relationship is initiated and partly
1 53
guided by principles of contract.
Periodically, contract figures directly in litigation that might
otherwise focus on malpractice. In one case a Maryland appeals court
held that a physician had a contract-based duty to help his patient file
important health-related documents with the latter's employer. 54 In
another case the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a Jehovah's
Witness patient had stated a claim for breach of contract, alongside
claims for battery, when the surgeon reneged on his repeated promises
not to transfuse blood.155
Moreover, as patients pay more health care costs directly, we
can expect an increased emphasis on contract alongside tort. People
with high-deductible health plans can be responsible for as much as
$5,000 per year as individuals or $10,000 per year as families. 15 6 As
observed by Professor Mariner, "[t]he more health care is perceived to
be a consumer good, the more likely it is that contract principles will
supersede tort principles in defining both access to care and rights and
1 57
obligations in care."
152. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); see also PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 34 (1988); R. A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice:
The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (1976); Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman,
Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 883 (1985); Stephen R. Feldman & Thomas M. Ward,
PsychotherapeuticInjury: Reshaping the Implied Contract as an Alternative to Malpractice, 58
N.C. L. REV. 64, 88 (1979); Jerry A. Green, Minimizing MalpracticeRisks by Role Clarification,
109 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 234 (1988).
153. ANGELA R. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 1 (2nd ed. 1978); Epstein, supra note
152; Green, supra note 152, at 235; Feldman, supra note 152; see also Chew v. Meyer, 527 A.2d
828, 832 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801
(N.D. Ohio 1965).
154. Chew, 527 A.2d. at 832 (finding that plaintiff stated a cause of action for breach of
contract when doctor failed to complete and file insurance documents because "the traditional
scope of the contractual relationship between doctor and patient ...has expanded over the years
as a result of the proliferation of health and disability insurance, sick pay and other employment
benefits").
155. "We have previously recognized that an action may be maintained for breach of an
express pre-treatment warranty to effect a particular result." Harvey v. Strickland, 566 S.E.2d
529, 534 (S.C. 2002) (citing Banks v. Med. Univ. of S.C, 444 S.E.2d 519 (S.C. 1994)). Accordingly,
the court ruled that a jury must consider whether an express contract was created.
156. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act § 1201(a), 26
U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (explaining the tax deductions allowed for an individual when he or she pays
money into a health savings account).
157. Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-ChoicePlans Satisfy Patients:Problems with Theory
and Practicein Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 495 (2003-2004).
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A. Basic Contract Principles
A contract is a legally enforceable exchange of promises. 158 Its
major terms, such as quantity, price, and payment terms must be
sufficiently definite to permit the parties (and the courts) to determine
what was promised by each side, whether the contract was broken,
and what would be an appropriate remedy for breach. 159 Terms,
except for quantity, can generally be left open. In some instances,
rather than specifying an exact price for the goods or services to be
exchanged, the contract will supply a reference to some independent,
objective standard, such as a market index.1 60 Alternatively, a court
might look to such evidence as the parties' course of performance
16 1 If
during a contract or their course of dealing under prior contracts.
one party sets the price, it must do so "in good faith."1 62 Absent such
helpful clues, the gap-filler for both the Uniform Commercial Code,
governing the sale of goods, 163 and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, is reasonableness: If the price is not supplied by the
64
parties, it must be a reasonable price.
In some instances the parties never form a contract, or what
they form is unenforceable. In these cases, an important alternative
can still be available. Under the theory of restitution, also known as
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, or quasi-contract, when one
party has conferred a benefit upon another, neither gratuitously nor
officiously, that party may be entitled to compensation as if there were
158. In some instances, a performance, rather than a promise, is sought from the promisor.
See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 151 (Found. Press 6th ed. 2001).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981) (requiring terms of contract to be
"reasonably certain"); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 158, at 251.
160. For goods, see U.C.C. § 2-305 (1977).
161. Farnsworth, supra note 158, at 252; U.C.C. § 1-205 (1977).
162. U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (1977).
163. Id. § 2-305.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 33 cmt. e (1981) states:

Indefinite price. Where the parties manifest an intention not to be bound unless the
amount of money to be paid by one of them is fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or
agreed there is no contract. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-305(4). Where they intend
to conclude a contract for the sale of goods, however, and the price is not settled, the
price is a reasonable price at the time of delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price, or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree, or (c) the price is
to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a
third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded. Uniform Commercial Code § 2305(1). Or one party may be given power to fix the price within limits set by
agreement or custom or good faith. Similar principles apply to contracts for the
rendition of service. But substantial damages cannot be recovered unless they can be
estimated with reasonable certainty (§ 352), and if the contract is entirely executory
and specific performance is not an appropriate remedy, relief may be limited to the
recovery of benefits conferred and specific expense incurred in reliance on the
contract.
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a contract. 16 5 Here, too, the amount of compensation must be
reasonable, reflecting the value of the benefit conferred.
B. Case Law
In the health care setting, prices are commonly discussed only
after performance. 166
Typically, the only antecedent inquiry is
whether the patient is insured or otherwise able to pay. 16 7 Not
surprisingly, this has prompted a number of cases in which patients,
in "sticker shock" over the amount they are asked to pay, either refuse
to pay and are sued by providers, or pay and then sue to recover at
least part of what they argue is an overcharge. Classic contract
principles have governed these cases' resolutions.
Some cases have granted the hospital a clean victory. In
Heartland Health Systems v. Chamberlin,6 8 the mother of an
eighteen-year-old who had been in a motor vehicle accident claimed
she did not realize what she was signing in the emergency room.
Moreover, she argued, since this was a contract of adhesion the bills
for her son's care should be limited by reasonable expectations. The
court ruled that the hospital had not committed any fraud or duress.
"[A] person is bound by the terms of a contract he signs," 16 9 and it was
reasonable for the mother to expect that she would have to pay for her
son's emergency care. Moreover, the uncontested testimony of the
hospital's financial representative was that these charges were
reasonable, customary, and consistent with those in the medical
industry. 170
165. Farnsworth, supra note 158, at 103, 106-07; see also, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§
40, 53 (1936); Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926, 930-31 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1997);
Doe v. HCA Health Serv. of Tennessee, Inc. 46 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tenn. 2001).
166. A prominent exception is cosmetic surgery. As a purely consumer product, these
procedures are only provided to those who can pay, and prices are typically provided in advance.
Interestingly, cosmetic surgery exhibits far more characteristics of a genuine market than the
rest of health care. From 1992-2001, the rise in cost for medical services was 47% in comparison
with the overall consumer price index, which rose 26%. In contrast, costs for cosmetic surgery
rose only 16%. Kenneth T. Bowden, Determining a Reasonable Price for Health Care in the
United States: Is This Possible?, 34 SPG BRIEF 26 (Spring 2005).
167. Richard M. Alderman, The Business of Medicine-Health Care Providers, Physicians,
and the Deceptive Trade PracticesAct, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 109, 129 (1989).
168. Heartland Health Sys. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
169. Id. at 10.
170. Id. at 11-12. See DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49000, *10 (D.N.J.
2006); Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718-19 (E.D. Mich. 2005);
Morrell v. Wellstar Health System, Inc., 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 736, *8-*9 (Ga. App. 2006). These
cases are part of a multidistrict class action against not-for-profit hospitals in which plaintiffs
allege, inter alia, that defendant hospitals have not provided adequate charity care and charge
indigent patients at excessively high rates. Because this body of litigation is quite recent and
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Hall v. Humana Hospital Daytona Beach 171 was a class action
filed by a group of patients who wanted partial refunds on payments
they argued were excessive and unreasonable. The sums they paid for
pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and lab services, the plaintiffs
argued, were disproportionate to the market price of the same items in
a non-market setting and therefore an "imposition."172 Examples
included $11.50 for one tablet of Zantac, $52 for one of Tylenol with
codeine, and $20.50 for one tablet of Cipro.
The Florida appellate court had no sympathy. Even if there
may have been elements of compulsion when they or their loved ones
were still hospitalized, the plaintiffs paid the bill when the need for
care had ended and any duress no longer existed. "By voluntarily
making payment of these alleged overcharges once the alleged
coercion practiced by Humana had ceased, [plaintiffs] ratified or
affirmed their prior agreement to pay these charges."'173 Two years
later, the same reasoning was applied by another Florida appellate
1 74
court under analogous circumstances.
In contrast, a number of courts have held that the charges of
institutional providers such as hospitals and nursing homes must be
reasonable. In Mercy Hospital, Inc. v Carr,175 for instance, a Florida
appeals court found that there was a valid contractual obligation owed
by a patient whose wife had signed releases agreeing to pay "in
accordance with existing standard and current rates as set forth in
76
regular schedules which are available for inspection and review."'
However, noting that the patient's husband had "demanded without
success to see the regular schedules containing the standard current
rates referred to by plaintiff hospital,"' 77 the court remanded the issue
back to the trial court to resolve the amount of defendant's liability.

only limited numbers of decisions have emerged, these cases will not receive special attention in
this Article.
171. Hall v. Humana Hosp Daytona Beach, 686 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1996).
172. In Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1995), rev.
denied, 671 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1996), the Florida appellate court defined "imposition" in terms of
exploiting someone's vulnerable position to extract a greater price than is fair or unreasonable.
See infra note 191.
173. Hall, 686 So. 2d at 657.
174. Greene v. Alachua Gen. Hosp., Inc., 705 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1998) (affirming
that voluntary payment on part of the debtor tends to show that an "imposition" did not exist).
But see Burton, 373 F. Supp. 2d 719 (holding, unlike in Hall v Humana, that the fact that
plaintiff had not paid the bill meant they were first to breach, hence could not "'maintain an
action against the other party for its subsequent breach or failure to perform').
175. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Carr, 297 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1974).
176. Id. at 599.
177. Id.
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The defendant was "entitled to question the reasonableness" of the
178
hospital's charges.
Similarly, in Victory Memorial Hospital v. Rice,179 an Illinois
appellate court found that the defendant-patient did owe payment to
the hospital. However, consistent with standard contract principles,
the court held that:
where there is a contract, express or implied, under which one party supplies articles or
services to another and there is no provision setting out the amount the supplier is to be
compensated, the law implies
that there is an agreement to pay a reasonable price for
18 0
the goods and services.

Although it would have been insufficient simply to show what the
charges were,1 8 ' in this case the hospital had provided ample evidence
about area hospitals' charges and its own internal methods for setting
prices. Hence, it had made a case for the reasonableness of its
charges.
In Protestant Hospital Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde,18 2 an
Illinois appellate court likewise found that a valid contract existed,
and that since there was no provision setting out the amount of
compensation, the law implies that the price must be reasonable.
Unlike Victory, this hospital had failed to demonstrate the
reasonableness of its charges. The court cited a paragraph in the
hospital's contract with the patient that,
in essence, vests in plaintiff unrestricted discretion in determining what price it will
charge for its materials and services. It can hardly be said that this paragraph provides
for a definite price where it offers no formula for computing prices other than the
discretion of the supplier. Therefore, this paragraph
does not rid plaintiff of its burden
18 3
of establishing the reasonableness of its charges.

Some hospitals have fared even less well. Payne v. Humana
Hospital Orange Park84 was a class action case in which plaintiff
patients complained that "instead of fair or reasonable compensation,
unreasonable, unconscionable, and excessive charges were exacted for
pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and laboratory services.' ' 8 5 The
court, making the familiar notation that "[w]hen a contract fails to fix

178. Id.
179. Victory Mem'l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
180. Id. at 119.
181. Id.
182. Protestant Hosp. Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde, 424 N.E.2d 1302 (Il. App. Ct. 1981).
183. Id. at 1306. The court went on to note that simply showing the bills that were sent to
the patient will not count as proof of reasonableness. Id.
184. Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1995), rev.
denied, 671 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1996).
185. Id. at 1239.
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a price, a reasonable price is implied,"'' 1 6 discussed the doctrine of
"imposition ....
Where a person taking advantage of his position, or the
circumstances in which another is placed, extracts a greater price for
services rendered than is fair and reasonable,... , the exaction of the
unreasonable price for the service rendered may be said to be an
imposition."'18 7 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against Humana.
In Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc.,'8 8 the plaintiff was the
widow of a man who had been a patient in Manor Care nursing home.
In addition to the home's daily rate, she had been charged for a
number of additional services. Although she had signed agreements
to pay such bills, she argued that the home's superior bargaining
power permitted it to set charges solely at its own discretion, except
for an obligation to disclose changes in the daily rate. Arguing that
the ancillary charges were excessive, she claimed the home was
unjustly enriched at her expense and demanded partial refund.
Citing Payne and other authorities, a Florida appellate court
reversed summary judgment for the defendant, holding that
appellant in this case stated a cause of action for breach of the implied covenants of
reasonableness, good faith, and fair dealing. Since the prices to be charged by the
facility were not expressly stated within the four corners of the contract, a reasonable
fee was implied, and appellant was not foreclosed from bringing an action based on
Manor Care's breach of this implied covenant. 189

Although voluntary payments cannot ordinarily be recovered,
"when 'money is obtained through "imposition", express or implied, or
extortion or oppression, or an undue advantage is taken of the
plaintiffs situation,' the payment is not voluntary and does not bar an
action for money had and received." 190 The court agreed that plaintiff
had stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment. 19'
Although the foregoing cases are predicated on a finding that a
bona fide contract existed, and that the absent price term must be
supplied by a reasonable price, some other courts have found that no
186. Id. at 1240.
187. Id. at 1241 (citing S. States Power Co. v. Ivey, 160 So. 46, 47 (Fla. 1935)) (emphasis
added by Payne court). Another court has defined imposition as "something less than coercion...
. [It occurs] when the payee 'tak[es] advantage of his position, or the circumstances in which
another is placed, [and] exacts a greater price for services rendered than is fair and reasonable."
Greene v. Alachua Gen. Hosp., Inc., 705 So. 2d 953, 953 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1998).
188. Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1997).
189. Id. at 929.
190. Id. (citing Cullen v Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 58 So. 182, 184 (Fla. 1912)).
191. The court provided the three elements of unjust enrichment: (1) plaintiff conferred a
benefit on defendant who is aware of the benefit; (2) defendant voluntarily accepted and retained
the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without paying for
it. Id. at 930-31.
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contract existed. In that situation, courts have been willing to grant
providers reasonable compensation via quantum meruit.
In Galloway v. Methodist Hospitals, Inc.,192 a woman presented
to the emergency room in active labor. Her husband signed a form
agreeing to receive treatment, but did not sign the form agreeing to
pay. When the hospital sued for payment, an Indiana appellate court
ruled that the hospital was entitled to receive compensation under a
theory of unjust enrichment. Moreover, the testimony of the hospital's
controller was found sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the
charges-given that the defendants did not challenge the hospital's
use of its controller to testify on that issue.
Perhaps the most interesting case in this area is Doe v. HCA
Health Services of Tennessee.193 The plaintiff had received services
from HCA's Donelson Hospital and, after insurance had paid its
portion, owed $1,346. Although the Does had signed an agreement to
be financially responsible, they claimed that the hospital's charges
were unreasonable. The hospital replied that "charges" was not an
indefinite term because it implicitly referred to the hospital's "charge
master," a comprehensive list of all charges. The trial court found
that there was a valid contract, and that although the price term was
made definite by this reference to the charge master, nevertheless the
hospital's charges must be reasonable.
The appellate court 194 also required reasonableness, but via
different reasoning.1 95 Although there was a valid contract, it did not
incorporate the hospital's charge master by reference. Instead, price
as a missing term must be supplied by "reasonableness."

192. Galloway v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
193. Doe v. HCA Health Serv. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001).
194. Doe v. HCA Health Serv. of Tenn., Inc., No.01-A-01-9806-CV00306, 1999 WL 652003
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 1999).
195. Id. at *2 ("It seems to us that the [trial] court applied a hospital exception to the general
law of contracts. While finding that the contract incorporated a price term by reference
(presumably the charge master), the court, nevertheless, held that the hospital's charges had to
be reasonable.").
Cf. DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49000, *10 (D.N.J.
2006) (holding that, in contract signed by uninsured emergency room patient, contract
unambiguously incorporated hospital's charge master as its price term); Burton v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718-19 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding that contract signed by
uninsured recipient of emergency room care, promising to pay all charges, was binding, and
refusing to invoke the U.C.C.'s requirement for "reasonableness" where price term is open,
because U.C.C. applies to goods, not service contracts such as those involved in this case);
Morrell v. Wellstar Health System, Inc., 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 736, *8-*9 (Ga. App. 2006)
(holding that contract signed by uninsured recipient of emergency room care, promising to pay
all charges, impliedly incorporated hospital's charge master list of prices, because Georgia
statute requiring hospital to provide a written summary of prices upon request must be
considered part of the contract).
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The Tennessee Supreme Court also found that reasonable
prices were required, but by yet a different line of reasoning. The
court noted that the charge master was confidential-that is, it was
proprietary information shown only to the hospital's officers,
employees, and authorized consultants-and that it was adjusted
weekly. There was no contract, the court concluded, because the
agreement was indefinite.
Even absent a contract, however, under quantum meruit 96 the
hospital was still entitled to compensation for its services. The case
was remanded for a finding of reasonable remuneration. 197 Citing
other case law, the court suggested that the trial court consider what
is charged by other hospitals in the community, plus any factors
relevant to that particular hospital. 198
Importantly, the requirement that fees be reasonable has been
applied to physicians, just as to hospitals. In Majid v. Stubblefield, 199
a patient who had undergone kidney stone removal made only partial
payment for services, arguing that charges were excessive. The
physician filed a small claims complaint to recover the rest. The court
cited Victory Memorial Hospital v. Rice,200 which
held that when a hospital seeks to establish its charges are reasonable, the hospital
must prove its charges are the usual and customary charges for that particular hospital
and they are comparable to the charges of other area hospitals .... While Victory
Memorial Hospital dealt solely with hospital charges, we find that its holding also
20 1
extends to doctors' fees.

The court went on to find one charge reasonable according to the
evidence, and another not proven to be reasonable.
Culverhouse v. Jackson20 2 also featured a physician bringing
suit to recover fees for professional services. The Georgia appellate
court reversed a trial judgment for the physician and held that, absent

196. The court identified the elements of unjust enrichment as follows: (1) the lack of an
enforceable contract; (2) the party seeking recovery provided goods or services; (3) the other party
received them; and (4) the parties should have reasonably understood that the provider of goods
or services expected to be compensated, and it would be unjust for recipient to retain the goods or
services without paying for them. Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 198.
197. In dicta, the court suggested that the trial court "must include consideration and
recognition of the particular hospital's costs, functions and services to make a valid
determination of whether such charges were reasonable for that hospital alone or compared to
the charges of other area hospitals." Id. at 199 (citing Victory Mem'l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d
117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
198. Id. at 198 (citing Galloway v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611 (Ind.Ct. App. 1995)
and Heartland Health Sys. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)).
199. Majid v. Stubblefield, 589 N.E.2d 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
200. Victory Mem'l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
201. Majid, 589 N.E.2d at 1048.
202. Culverhouse v. Jackson, 194 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
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proof about the ordinary, reasonable value of the physician's services,
the evidence was not sufficient to authorize a judgment for the
physician. 20 3 "No proof was submitted as to the ordinary and
reasonable value of the services. Thus the evidence was insufficient to
20 4
authorize the judgment."
C. "ReasonableCharge": An Elusive Concept
By various means, then, a variety of courts have determined
that providers, whether hospitals or individual physicians, can charge
only reasonable fees for their services and goods. Unfortunately,
"reasonable" remains murky and ill-defined. Some courts, probably
focusing on the marketplace as a means for setting prices, suggest
that a hospital "must prove its charges are the usual and customary
charges for that particular hospital and they are comparable to the
charges of other area hospitals."20 5 In some instances such internal
factors as the "particular hospital's costs, functions and services" are
20 6
permissible.
Unfortunately for hospitals and physicians, a strong case can
be made that "prevailing" or "usual" or "customary" charges are not
necessarily "reasonable," particularly in the eyes of jurors who
increasingly pay for health care out of their own HSAs or pockets.
They, like the plaintiffs in Hall,2°7 may not think it reasonable to
charge $52 for a single tablet of Tylenol with codeine, no matter how
208
customary that price might be.
Arguably the greatest factor prompting a disjunction between
the supply-and-demand mechanism that usually sets market prices,
versus the forces that set health care pricing, is third party payment
for health care. 20 9 As generous health insurance became standard
during and after World War II, and expanded in 1965 to encompass
203. Id. at 586.
204. Id.; see also Poulson v. Foster, 293 N.W. 361, 362 (S.D. 1940) (holding in a case where a
dentist sued his patient for failure to pay that it was insufficient for the dentist simply to state
his charges; rather, he must show that they are reasonable).
205. Majid, 589 N.E.2d at 1048 (citing Victory Mem'l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117 (Ill App.
Ct. 1986)); see also Doe v. HCA Health Serv. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001); Galloway
v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995),
206. Victory Mem'l Hosp., 493 N.E.2d at 120.
207. Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach, 686 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1996).
208. Id. at 655.
209. "In most of the economy, competitive markets are seen as the force that leads to a
structure of prices that reflects the structure of costs. But since medical care is financed largely
by third parties, this mechanism does not necessarily function." Paul B. Ginsburg & Joy M.
Grossman, When the Price Isn't Right: How Inadvertent Payment Incentives Drive Medical Care,

HEALTH AFF., Aug. 9, 2005, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org.
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the elderly and poor through Medicare and Medicaid, patients became
increasingly insulated from the costs of their care. Physicians could
order virtually any service or product, safe in the knowledge that it
would be paid for, while patients had little concern about what costs
their insurer would absorb. Even employers, who provided most of the
coverage for working Americans, initially had little concern about the
costs of health care because they enjoyed tax savings for providing this
210
benefit.
Insurers' modes of reimbursement were probably even more
2 11
important to the explosion of health care costs. As noted above,
payment on a retrospective, fee-for-service basis encouraged hospitals
and physicians to provide as many services as possible.
The
inflationary effects of FFS were compounded by fee structures that
212
permitted providers to charge virtually whatever they wanted.
From its inception, Medicare based providers' payment on its
"customary, prevailing, and reasonable" ("CPR") system, while private
insurers promptly installed their virtually identical "usual, customary,
2 13
and reasonable" ("UCR") system.
In this UCR/CPR schema, the first component "is defined
generally as the price that the individual physician most often charges
for a given service. '"214 The second component "is based on aggregate
charges in the community." 21 5
Medicare "established the 75th
percentile as the basis for its 'prevailing' allowance," while Blue Shield
plans initially chose "the 90th percentile of charges in the community,
i.e., the point at which only 10 percent of charges are higher." 216
Finally, "reasonable" allowances under either system would permit a
21 7
fee to go higher for an individual complex case.
The skyrocketing of providers' fees was predictable, as seen in
two studies of physician fees following the enactment of
Medicare/Medicaid. Benson Roe observed:
The explosion of fees started with a few audacious physicians who, recognizing the wideopen potential of the system, billed third-party insurers at very high levels-and got
paid. They were generally young doctors just starting practice and lacking a previous

210. BALANCING ACT, supra note 2, at 8-17.
211. See supra Part I.
212. This arrangement was largely the product of lobbying by the then-powerful medical
community. Roe, supra note 3, at 41-45. See generally Thomas L. Delbanco et al., Paying the
Physician'sFee: Blue Shield and the Reasonable Charge, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1314, 1314-20

(1979) (analyzing Medicare's impact on physician fees).
213. Delbanco, supra note 212, at 1315-16.
214. Id. at 1316.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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record of charges, so that their 'usual' fee could be whatever they chose.... Later, when
the carriers adopted some payment restrictions, these extraordinary charges were not
initially reimbursed at the level submitted, but they contributed to raising the
,customary' average and established an individual profile of charges as the basis for
future payments .... The older and more experienced practitioners tended to maintain
their lower fees until they learned that young upstarts were being paid more than they
were, so naturally their fees were raised to match-often to
levels that most of them
2 18
would not otherwise have considered. Thus the spiral began.

Similarly, Dr. Thomas Delbanco et al. pointed out that
[a]lthough customary levels in the community are kept secret, it is easy for a physician
to discover the maximum charge allowable for any given procedure or test. All the
physician has to do is to charge a high fee and see what is paid. If the entire charge is
accepted, he or she is at or below the customary level. Charges above this level help
raise the customary allowance level at the next annual updating. Only charges more
than twice the customary level are
omitted from the pool of charges that determine
219
changes in subsequent allowances.

In the Washington, D.C., area, this generous fee structure meant, for
instance, that fees for coronary artery bypass surgery surged 75
percent from 1975 to 1978.220
For hospitals, the same payment system produced the same
results. Eventually, as noted above, 221 financial structures began to
change with the federal government's 1982 introduction of DRG
payments for hospitalization of Medicare patients. 222 Yet the effects
were limited. Retrospective FFS payment remains in many health
plans, and the historic power of UCR/CPR has helped to entrench a
major disjunction between ordinary market pricing mechanisms and
those within health care.
For hospitals, current pricing structures are mysterious at
best. As noted in Doe, hospitals commonly use an internal document
called a "charge master. '223 It lists the hospital's official billing
charges for thousands of goods and services. Charge masters are
usually kept confidential, even from most of the hospital's employees,
224
and typically are adjusted from week to week.
218. Roe, supra note 3, at 41-42.
219. Delbanco, supra note 212, at 1317.
220. Id.
221. See supra Part I.
222. Under DRGs, instead of paying hospitals for each service they provided and for every
day the patient stayed, the government radically altered the incentive structure. Hospitals would
now be paid a set sum for that hospital episode, based on the patient's chief diagnosis and
selected other factors such as sex, age, and comorbidities. Now the hospital would be rewarded
by doing less, rather than by maximizing its services. BALANCING ACT, supra note 2, at 15; see
also Ginsburg & Grossman, supra note 120.
223. Doe v. HCA Health Serv. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tenn. 2001).
224.
Every hospital has a "Charge Master" ...
file of all costs and charges for every
hospital service, drug, or procedure-which is used to generate both a hospital invoice
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Furthermore, as explained in the appellant's brief in Doe,22 5
prices in a charge master are not necessarily based on any analysis of
the costs of providing various goods and services. In Doe, the hospital
employee who set the charge master acknowledged in testimony that
"he has never conducted studies to determine the actual costs of
delivering goods and services in setting the Charge Master rates.
Instead he just 'estimates it'."226
In fairness to hospitals, basing charges on the actual costs of
providing services can be very difficult. For instance, internal costshifting is widespread, in which prices for some common items are set
high, to generate extra revenue to cover some of the costliest goods
and services. 22 7 For this and other reasons, determining the actual
cost of providing a given service will ordinarily require considerable
resources to track down its myriad sub-costs. There is little incentive
to undertake such an effort, 228 given that payors reimburse care
according to actual or negotiated charges, not hospitals' actual costs.
The net result is little, if any, correlation between a charge master
price and the price that the same service or product might have if
purchased in a direct, supply-and-demand economy.
The wide discrepancies among various hospitals' charge
masters were recently revealed in California, where a new state law
mandates their publication:
and the standard required federal UB-92 form that accounts for all inpatient or
outpatient hospital procedures. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) compiles this information annually in its Medicare Cost Reports. The reports
detail every hospital's costs and charges by department and cost centers. Thus,
Medicare knows each hospital's average daily costs to provide care for a patient.
Randy Suttles & Merrill Matthews, Investigative Report: Overcharging the Uninsured-Part1,
HEALTH CARE NEWS, Sept. 1, 2003, available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId
=12775. As noted in Doe, the charge master is "a confidential list of charges used to compute
charges for all private commercial patients who are treated on a fee-for-service basis." 46 S.W.3d
at 194. In 1991, Donelson Hospital's charge master had 7,650 items, running 295 pages. Id.
225. Brief of Appellee, Doe v. HCA Health Serv. of Tenn., Inc., No. M1998-00267-SC-R11-CV
(Tenn. May 5, 2000).
226. Id. at 18-19 (internal citations omitted).
227. Id. at 17. "Hospitals report that a strong motivation for expanding more profitable
services is to cross-subsidize these less-well-paid services as well as to provide sufficient margins
to fund uncompensated care." Ginsburg & Grossman, supra note 120.
228.
Assessing the unit costs of each of a large number of services requires major effort to
gather information on direct inputs, such as labor, space, supplies, and equipment,
and sophisticated formulas to allocate indirect costs, such as general management.
Although estimating unit costs can be relatively easy for services in which a
purchased input constitutes a large share of the cost, such as drugs or devices,
estimating the costs of most services is far more difficult because the most important
inputs produce numerous distinct services. Few hospitals use sophisticated cost
accounting systems to set charges.
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An examination of chargemasters at several hospitals shows that pricing strategies
fluctuate wildly--on everything from brain scans to painkillers to leeches. Depending on
a hospital's pricing method, the charge for the same commodity or service,
such as a
2 29
blood test, can vary by as much as 17-fold from one institution to another.

Examples were striking: a basic chest x-ray with two views ranged
from $120 to $1,519; a comprehensive metabolic panel ranged from
$97 to $1,733; CT scan of the head (without contrast) went from $882
to $4,038; a single tablet of Tylenol could be no charge or $7; leeches
ranged from $19 to $81 each. 230 The very idea of calling any of these
"customary" or "usual" defies credibility. Clearly, what is customary is
the variation, not the prices.
Further exacerbating this, most payors negotiate their own
rates with providers, and any given payor will typically negotiate
different payment arrangements with different providers. 2 31 While
some payors directly negotiate their own fees, 232 others pay a specified
233
percentage of the charge master.
As a result, charge master listings are not the fees that most
patients are asked to pay. Because of the deep discounts negotiated
with most third-party payors, virtually the only ones who are actually
expected to pay the charge master rates are those who lack insurance.
Moreover, these charge masters are often highly inflated because the
hospital needs to compensate for the deep discounts given to
insurers. 234 Data from one California hospital system showed that,
although uninsured and walk-in patients accounted for less than 2

229. Lucette Lagnado, Medical Markup: California Hospitals Open Books, Showing Huge
Price Differences, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at Al.
230. Id.
Some of the prices insurers pay for the latest technology are surprisingly high.
Harvard Pilgrim pays $717 to $1,240 for a brain MRI, which is commonly used to look
for tumors, and $2,141 to $3,180 for a knee arthroscopy, a minor surgical procedure to
repair torn ligaments. Blue Cross, which lists the cost of 22 outpatient and overnight
procedures, pays providers $2,000 to $3,500 for a cardiac catheterization to measure
heart function, and $5,600 to $6,600 for a routine childbirth.
Liz Kowalczyk, Insurers Post Prices for Medical Care, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 2004; see also
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Childbirth for Bargain-Hunters:PregnantWomen Take Lead In Negotiating
Over Prices Amid Cutbacks in Coverage, WALL ST. J., April 5, 2005, at Dl (noting that the cost of
childbirth can range from $7,000 to $12,000).
231. "Insurers post a price range for each procedure because they pay individual hospitals
and doctors different fees based on the contracts they've negotiated." Kowalczyk, supra note 230.
232. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee, Doe v. HCA Health Serv. of Tennessee, Inc., No. M199800267-SC-Rl1-CV, at 3 (Tenn. May 5, 2000) (noting that "Blue Cross/Blue Shield negotiates an
item-by-item, lower-priced Charge Master and, then, pays only a percentage of the reduced
charges."); see also Suttles, supra note 224 (noting that 'Medicare is required to 'set rates that
cover the costs efficient providers would incur in furnishing care to beneficiaries,"' and that
Medicare and most HMOs have their own negotiated rates).
233. Id.
234. Bowden, supra note 166, at 2.
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percent of the patient population, they accounted for as much as 35
235
percent of the chain's total profits.
Costs for physician services are better organized. In 1991, the
federal government introduced the Resource-Based Relative Value
Scale ("RBRVS"), by which it pays for Medicare physician services.
Relative values for more than 4000 medical services, determined largely by Hsiao's
research team and accounting for approximately 85 percent of Medicare's annual
payments to physicians, were included in the HCFA's [Health Care Financing
Administration's] proposed rule of June 5.
Relative values for each service are
calculated on the basis of the work provided by the physicians, physicians' office
expenses (including the salaries of nonphysician personnel and the cost of office space,
equipment, and supplies), and the malpractice insurance costs associated with every
medical service.
The estimates of work provided were calculated according to
236
specialty.

"The reform was based on the assumption that fee-for-service
medicine will remain the dominant mode of payment and that the
government should reduce the disparity between payment for
diagnostic and surgical procedures and payment for evaluation and
'237
management (cognitive services... ) and regulate fees more tightly.
Although this modicum of rationality has been introduced for
Medicare's physician fees, the RBRVS system has likely become
distorted over the years, because it is difficult to update. 238 Further,

235. Id. The burden on the uninsured is not quite as arbitrary as it may seem. Historically,
under the UCR/CPR approach, providers were required to identify their "usual" fees. Typically,
insurers paid a designated proportion, such as 80%, and the patient was expected to pay the
remainder. However, if a provider routinely waived patients' copayments, it could constitute a
form of insurance fraud because, in fact, the true "usual" fee would be the figure paid by
insurance, not the larger amount billed. See Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Colo. 1988)
(noting that a regular practice of waiving certain fees could amount to health care abuse). Hence
providers feared giving discounts to the uninsured-the only ones left to pay their usual feesbecause of legal difficulties from federal antikickback statute and other laws. Bowden, supra
note 166, at 2. The refusal to grant discounts to the uninsured is changing, however. "[O]n Feb
19, 2004, the Secretary of DHHS "informed the Amer Hospital Ass'n that discounts to the
uninsured are permissible, and the OIG issued clarifying materials." Id. at 2. Thereafter, a
number of major hospital corporations, including Tenet Healthcare, Centura Health, and HCA
announced significant discounts for uninsured patients. Id. The importance of this change is
that, if even the uninsured no longer must pay the charge master rates, then these price
catalogues will be even more meaningless than in the past. Further, they will be even less of a
basis for identifying a "reasonable" fee, in response to judicial mandates.
236. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The Struggle Over Physician-PaymentReform,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 823, 825 (1991). See generally William C. Hsiao et al., Estimating
Physicians' Work for a Resource-Based Relative-Value Scale, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 835 (1988)
(developing an RBRVS scale for determining physician payment levels); William C. Hsiao et al.,
Results and Policy Implications of the Resource-Based Relative-Value Study, 319 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 881 (1988) (comparing and analyzing the difference between then-current charges and
RBRVs in four major medical specialties).
237. Iglehart, supra note 236, at 824.
238.
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RBRVS does not dictate physicians' fees for non-Medicare patients.
Like hospitals, physicians typically receive negotiated fees from
various insurers, and these can vary substantially from one payor to
the next. Although some health plans base their physician fees
directly on RBRVS, others' fees are only loosely inspired by it.239
Moreover, independent factors can vary the fees further, such as the
physician's prestige, the insurers' need to maintain an adequate
provider network by matching competitors' fees, 240 the number of
physicians in the area, and whether the physician is in a large or
24 1
small practice group.
Perhaps more important from patients' perspective, the
amount a patient will owe a physician will depend on whether that
physician is in her insurer's network. If not, the insurer will simply
pay that physician whatever it deems "reasonable." If the physician
nevertheless bills a higher amount, he may expect the patient to make
up the difference. 242 Additionally, some patients in CDHPs will not be
in such networks in the first place. One of the proffered advantages of
consumer-defined health care is that the patient is free to choose any
providers she wants, at least for care within the deductible. She can
negotiate with providers on her own, and seek out those willing to
243
agree to acceptable fees. Many patients are doing just that.
D. Juriesand the Quest for the Reasonable Fee
From the foregoing, it is obvious that health care pricing differs
significantly from ordinary markets. Third party payment and a host
of other factors mean that pricing does not reflect supply and demand,
but rather is more often a function of the incentives embedded in
arcane, diverse, and constantly changing payment systems.
In contrast to hospital relative payments, those for physician services are based
directly on estimates of relative costs. But even if the starting relative values were
highly accurate, shortcomings related to updating the relative values have likely
introduced important divergences from relative costs ....
Recent research conducted
for MedPAC suggests that factors other than costs play important roles in
determining charges and that once charges are set for a new service, the vast majority
are not revisited but are updated by uniform percentage increases.
Ginsburg & Grossman, supra note 120.
239. ZACHARY DYCKMAN & PEGGY HESS, SURVEY OF HEALTH PLANS CONCERNING PHYSICIAN
FEES AND PAYMENT METHODOLOGY 12 (2003), available at http://www.medpac.gov/publicatio

ns/contractor-reports/Aug03-PhysPaySurvey(cont)Rpt.pdf.
240. Id. at 18.

241. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Insurer Reveals What Doctors Really Charge,WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
2005, at D1.
242. S. Rubenstein, As Health Deductibles Increase, So Does Consumers' Confusion, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 28, 2005.
243. Fuhrmans, supra note 241.
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Complicating all this is the usual difficulty for a patient to find
out what a particular provider will charge for some service or product.
"Insurers typically put confidentiality agreements into their contracts
with medical providers, with the goal of keeping providers from
getting information that could boost their bargaining power....
Insurers also don't want rival insurers to know about the deals they
strike with doctors, as the insurers compete with each other for
business. Hospitals and doctors, who may accept less from one insurer
than another, also have a stake in keeping the amounts they'll accept
24 4
secret."
Moreover, physicians who discuss fees with each other could
engender antitrust scrutiny as possible price-fixing. And l;ke health
plans, physicians may not wish to forfeit the bargaining leverage that
245
secrecy provides.
Amidst this economic chaos, it is not at all clear how juries are
to divine a "reasonable fee." Courts provide little guidance as they
remand the issue to these triers of fact. 246 Because fee structures are
both diverse and secret, a provider's testimony that he considers his
fees to be within community norms may not be based on any actual
knowledge of those norms. Moreover, the only way jurors may be able
to obtain information about what other providers charge is via
detailed testimony from a variety of providers, and even this
244. S. Rubenstein, PatientsPaying for Medical Care Struggle to Divine the Costs New Tools
Give Price of a Doctor Visit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005. 'The Charge Master is considered
confidential proprietary information," shown only to the hospital's officers, selected employees,
and authorized consultants. Doe v HCA Health Serv. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tenn.
2001).
Insured patients are supposed to be charged the same prices for their out-of-pocket
costs that doctors or hospitals would charge the insurer. But insurers and many
health-care providers generally consider those negotiated prices proprietary
information that they don't want publicized. At most, health plans have made
available just a range or estimated average of what a service costs in a specific region.
Fuhrmans, supra note 241.
245.
Doctors also cite federal and state laws that say competing insurers and doctors can't
band together with their rivals to set the same prices across the board. Though the
Federal Trade Commission doesn't say a doctor can't tell an individual patient their
negotiated rates, sharing those rates with other physicians can sometimes lead to
government scrutiny, making doctors hesitant to talk about them with anybody, says
William Jessee, a doctor and chief executive of the Medical Group Management
Association, an organization of people who manage and lead group medical practices.
Rubenstein, supra note 244.
246. Bowden, supra note 166, at 1. See Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 198 (noting that no Tennessee
appellate cases had considered how to determine whether hospital charges were reasonable);
Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Carr, 297 So. 2d 598, 598 (Fla. App. 1974) (remanding for determination of
reasonableness); Victory Mem'l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (noting
that a hospital's reasonable charges can include that particular hospital's, costs, facilities,
functions, and services).
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information provides no assurance that those charges are typical.
Charge masters are likely to be viewed with increasing skepticism.
The very idea of paying $52 for a single tablet of Tylenol with
248
codeine, 247 or $1,519 for a chest x-ray, or $4,038 for a CT of the head
is unlikely to strike many jurors as "reasonable."
Indeed, the very concept of "usual" or "customary" charges will
likely lose credibility, even though some courts have asked triers of
fact to look to what other providers in the community charge. 249 And
in the unusual case where there is some consistency among providers'
charges, the bare fact that "everyone else" also charges grossly
inflated fees is unlikely to impress jurors who, as working men and
women, are increasingly likely to be paying their own health care
costs.
V. PROGNOSIS AND SOME HOPE
Health care pricing must become more rational, and it must
become more visible. 250 If CDHPs become as widespread as many
observers predict, both these things are likely to happen, at least to
some extent. Indeed, changes are already occurring.
One potential source of leverage for opening up pricing
structures may be states' consumer protection laws. Although this
important question is beyond the scope of this Article, it may be noted
that some complaints about health care prices have included claims
that these laws had been violated. 251 Per one argument, consumer
protection laws may, or at least should, mandate up-front price
252
disclosures at the time treatment decisions are made.
Meanwhile, the marketplace is beginning to ameliorate the
problem as patients themselves take the helm. With a direct interest

247. Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach, 686 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
248. Lagnado, supra note 229.
249. See Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 198; Galloway v. Methodist Hosp. Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995); Heartland Health Sys., Inc. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
Victory Mem'l Hosp., 493 N.E.2d at 120.
250. "For a true market in medical care to develop, consumers will need what they have
when they shop for cars: information on quality and price." Charles Stein, HealthcarePrice Tag
is Coming Your Way, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2004.

251. See, e.g., Doe v HCA Health Serv. of Tenn., Inc., No. 01-A-01-9806-CV00306, 1999 WL
652003, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 1999) (noting that the Consumer Protection Act claim was
dismissed by the trial court judge).
252. Alderman, supra note 167, at 127-32. See generally, Marshall B. Kapp, Enforcing
Patient Preferences: Linking Payment for Medical Care to Informed Consent, 261 J. AM. MED.

ASSOC. 1935 (1989) (advocating enforcement of patient preferences by allowing financial
reimbursement for medical services only after receiving the patient's informed consent for the
service); Morreim, supra note 99.
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in conserving their own resources, many are beginning to negotiate
directly with their providers to secure affordable pricing.
And
physicians are often happy to cooperate.
Billions of dollars in medical bills go unpaid each year. Medical providers, therefore, are
amenable to working with patients, even if it means accepting less than full price....
[Mledical providers often would rather2 5 3have a reduced amount in hand than spend a
bundle trying to track down bad debts.

In some cases, negotiating services have sprung up to work with
physicians and hospitals on patients' behalf, for instance to arrange
254
costs for childbirth.
Governments are beginning to release pricing information or to
mandate that providers do so. Medicare, for instance, now places on
its website price comparisons for brand name drugs used to treat such
conditions as high blood pressure, arthritis, high cholesterol, and the
like. 25 5 As noted above, California now mandates that hospitals make
public their charge masters. 256 A new Illinois law requires hospitals
and surgery centers to report costs of various outpatient procedures,
257
as well as their success rates.
Insurers, too, are making finances more transparent. Several
are now publishing on their websites what they pay to doctors and
hospitals for various outpatient tests and procedures. These include
Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts Health Plan. 258 Others, such as Humana,
Aetna, and Lumenos, provide tools to estimate the costs that patients
will pay, based on their particular insurance package, for selected
procedures at various local hospitals. 259 Cigna is listing "specific price
ranges for hospitals nationwide for 15 common admissions, such as
child birth, angioplasty, and coronary bypass surgery," in addition to
the quality and efficiency rankings it already provides for these
admissions. 260 One hospital in Kansas now offers a "Price Line"
261
service to help patients figure out what a hospitalization may cost.
253. Kaja Whitehouse, Health Costs: Negotiating DoctorBills, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2005, at
2.
254. Fuhrmans, supra note 241.
255. Robert Pear, Price Comparisonfor Drugs is Put on Federal Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2004, at A18; Sarah Lueck, Prices U.S. Pays Hospitals, Doctors To Be Publicized, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 14, 2006.
256. Lagnado, supra note 248.
257. Christi Parsons, State Will Post Surgery Prices: Outpatient Date to Go Online in
January '07, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 2005, at 1.
258. Kowalczyk, supra note 230.
259. Rubenstein, supra note 244.
260. Lewis Krauskopf, Cigna to Publicize Pricesfor Medical Procedures,REUTERS NEWS, Nov
28, 2005.
261. Lola Butcher, Saint Luke's Helps Consumers Determine Costs Upfront, KAN. CITY BUS.
J., Sept. 19, 2005, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/industries/healthcare/health_
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In perhaps the most striking departure from the confidentiality about
fees, Aetna is now making available the exact prices it pays Cincinnati
area physicians for a wide variety of tests and procedures. It plans to
do the same elsewhere in the country, in the hope of fostering savvier
consumers. 262 In another instance, a private corporation plans to
collect and make pricing information available in exchange for a
263
modest fee.
Perhaps with the sunshine of such exposure will come the
pressure to force greater rationality on health care pricing. While the
advantages and disadvantages of CDHPs and HSAs can be debated,
the increasingly direct involvement of patients in the economics of
their care is already triggering a move toward greater accountability
and communication about this important aspect of care. If indeed that
comes true, then perhaps at least some of the litigation discussed in
this Article can be averted. It is to be sincerely hoped.

insurance/2005/09/19fkansascity-focus3.html. Other hospitals are beginning to provide more
specific information about the quality of their care, including the Cleveland Clinic and
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center. Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Hospitals Give
PatientsMore Data, WALL ST. J., April 6, 2005, at D4.
262. Fuhrmans, supra note 241.
263. Jon Sarche, Company Details True Cost of Health Care, MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 20, 2006,
available at http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/living/health/14141 815.htm.

